Category: Criminal Procedure

Restitution and Ex Post Facto

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument on whether a restitution order under the federal Mandatory Victim Restitution Act is a criminal sanction, subject to the constitutional prohibition against retroactive legislation in the Ex Post Facto Clause. The case is Ellingburg v. United States, No. 24-482.

The legislation and its history provide enough indications that Congress intended a criminal sanction that the Solicitor General agreed with the defendant, and the court appointed an amicus curiae (friend of the court) to argue in support of the court of appeals’ judgment. Appointed amici do not often prevail in this situation, although it does happen. Not likely in this case. Continue reading . . .

New Cases for the New Term

The U.S. Supreme Court’s term begins Monday. As usual, the court held a conference the Monday before to discuss which cases to take up from the long list that accumulated over the summer. A short list of cases taken was released this morning. A long list of orders from the conference will be released Monday. In past years the opening Monday orders list has typically had a long list of denials and no additional grants. Update (10/6): As expected, the Monday orders list has no additional grants.

Today’s list has five cases taken up, all civil cases, and only one even tangentially related to crime. This continues a disturbing pattern of disinterest in fixing the massive number of precedents in criminal law and procedure that are clearly wrong under the current doctrine of interpreting the Constitution according to its original understanding.

The tangentially related case is Wolford v. Lopez, AG of Hawaii, No. 24-1046. This is a gun control case regarding controlled carry on private property. Three years ago, the Supreme Court issued a major decision regarding the Second Amendment and original understanding (or “text, history, and tradition”) in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Major decisions always involve a lot of detail-filling in the years following. In Wolford, the petitioner asked the high court to review two questions. It took one of them: Continue reading . . .

Victim Restitution and the Ex Post Facto Clause

“Moving the goalposts” is widely recognized as an unfair thing to do. In criminal law, the issue rises to a constitutional one. From the beginning, the Constitution has forbidden both Congress and state legislatures from passing “ex post facto laws.”* The primary, and simple, effect of this prohibition is that a legislature cannot make an act criminal or increase the punishment for it after it has been committed, i.e., “after the fact,” in Latin.

Does a law that increases the length of time in which a restitution award may be collected constitute an ex post facto law? The U.S. Supreme Court today took up a case to decide that question, Ellingburg v. United States, No. 24-482.

There are two good arguments why the answer is no. Continue reading . . .

No, Defendant Does Not Get Off Scot-Free for a Technical Error

This post on March 16 discussed the Supreme Court case of Smith v. United States, No. 21-1576. Smith had been tried in the wrong district, and his conviction was reversed on appeal. He claimed that the venue was an element of the offense, such that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded his retrial in the correct district.

I wrote then, “When this case first came up, I thought the claim to be so obviously wrong that there was no chance the Court would buy it. I still think so.”

Sure enough, the high court today decided that Smith can be retried. Unanimously. Continue reading . . .

Forfeiture Procedure

The U.S. Supreme Court today took up a case on forfeiture procedure for full briefing in the coming months and argument next fall.

The Question Presented in Culley v. Marshall, No. 22-585, as framed by the attorney for the petitioner, is:

In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the “speedy trial” test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.

Counterman v. Colorado, No. 22-138, on anti-stalking laws and the First Amendment, will be argued Wednesday. CJLF’s amicus brief is here.

Getting Off Scot Free for a Technical Error?

Paul Larkin and Cully Stimson have this article in the Federalist Society Review previewing the case of Smith v. United States, No. 21-1576, set for argument in the Supreme Court Tuesday, March 28.

Smith was tried in the wrong district, so the Eleventh Circuit reversed his conviction and granted him a new trial in the correct district. He claims that’s not enough; he should get off completely. Larkin and Stimson explain why that is not the law. Continue reading . . .

Co-Defendant Statements and Joint Trials

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning took up a case on the perennial knotty problem of the admissibility of co-defendant statements in joint trials. The case is Samia v. United States, No. 22-196. The out-of-court statement of one defendant is admissible against the defendant who made it, but generally not to incriminate other defendants. Continue reading . . .

Venue and Double Jeopardy

Does a venue error equal a Get Out of Jail Free card? That is, if the government files its charges in a locale that is later determined to be incorrect, does the defendant walk regardless of how clearly guilty he is or how atrocious the crime is? Or can he be retried in the venue now deemed correct?

The U.S. Supreme Court took up this question this morning in Smith v. United States, No. 21-1576.

California Legislature Ramming Through Another Pro-Murderer Bill

Today, there was a hearing scheduled on California Senate Bill 300, a bill to change the state’s “special circumstance” law in favor of the murderers, with an implication that it applies retroactively to overturn cases already properly tried. However, the “hearing” has been limited to people stating if they support or oppose, with no opportunity to give the reasons, making it pointless. So here is what I would have said.

In California, first-degree murder with “special circumstances” is punishable by death or life in prison without possibility of parole. The law is subject to the criticism that the special circumstances are not special enough, and I have proposed some pruning myself in the past. SB 300 would limit special-circumstance murder for accomplices to those who can be proved to have intended to kill. In 1990, Proposition 115 added a “reckless disregard of human life” alternative for accomplices convicted of first-degree murder under the felony murder rule, implementing an option allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tison v. Arizona (1987).

Applied to future cases, that would not necessarily be a bad change. It would have virtually no effect on capital punishment, as today’s juries seldom-to-never impose the death penalty on accomplices without an intent to kill. The huge problem is imposing such a fact-finding requirement retroactively. This is not speculation. We have been there and done that. It was the key issue in the first capital case I ever briefed. Continue reading . . .

Time to Overrule Miranda?

Yes, there is hope.  I explain why in my Substack entry,  here.  As a teaser, my first two paragraphs are:

In an earlier entry, “Democracy Dies in Judicial Imperialism,” I noted the similarity between Roe v. Wade and Miranda v. Arizona. In each case, the Court treated the liberal elite’s view of law as if it were part of the Constitution, thus to insulate it from any input from that pesky hoi polloi sometimes known as “voters.”

Roe and Miranda are probably the two most important examples of the sort of obey-your-betters judicial imperialism I was talking about. Roe went down three weeks ago. In this entry, I ask whether it’s time for Miranda to follow it into history’s dustbin. To avoid any suspense, the short answer is yes — indeed it’s past time — but I have my doubts that this is going to happen any time soon, even with a Supreme Court, like this one, that takes the Constitution seriously, both for what it says and what it refrains from saying. I’ll explain momentarily why I think Miranda will be with us for a while despite a more disciplined Court.