Category: U.S. Supreme Court

Emergency Entry and the Fourth Amendment

by · Jan 14, 2026 2:24 pm

Here is a bit deeper dive on Case v. Montana, the U.S. Supreme Court emergency entry case that I noted briefly this morning. Although the high court affirmed the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court, it did so with a more limiting standard than the state court used. Three standards have been used by various courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court chose the middle one. The standard is unique to emergency cases, rejecting both looser and more restrictive standards derived from criminal investigation cases.

The emergency in this case was created when Case’s former girlfriend reported that Case had said during a phone call that he intended to kill himself. This was followed by a click that may have been a gun being cocked, a pop that may have been a discharge, and then dead air. This information, combined with Case’s history, make it hard to see how the state could have lost this case under any standard. The strong possibility that he had already shot himself but might be still alive and in need of emergency aid to save his life seems compelling.

The Montana Supreme Court thought that the “community caretaking” function of the police permits entry of a home in emergency situations “when ‘objective, specific and articulable facts’ would lead an ‘experienced officer [to] suspect’ that a person inside ‘is in need of help or is in peril.’ ” That is the minimal standard needed for the police to briefly detain someone on the street, known as a “Terry stop” for the 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio. The defendant wanted the much more restrictive standard needed for search warrants: probable cause. He cited cases from the D.C., Second, and Eleventh Circuits supporting that view.

In the 2006 case of Brigham City v. Stuart, the Supreme Court set out a rule for entry to a home in an emergency: “Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” Is the Brigham City standard equivalent to either the Terry standard or the probable cause standard? Continue reading . . .

SCOTUS Decides Double Punishment and Emergency Entry Cases

by · Jan 14, 2026 8:54 am

The U.S. Supreme Court decided two criminal cases today. In Barrett v. United States, the court decided that if a single act violates two provisions of a notoriously complex federal firearms statute the defendant can only be punished for one of them. In Case v. Montana the court confirmed that entry into a home for the purpose of emergency assistance requires only “an “objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone inside needs emergency assistance.” Probable cause is not required. “The probable-cause requirement is rooted in, and derives its meaning from, the criminal context, and we decline to transplant it to this different one.”

Both decisions are unanimous, although Justice Gorsuch declines to join one subpart of the Barrett opinion.

SCOTUS Softens Limits on Repeat Petitions by Federal Prisoners (But Not Much)

by · Jan 9, 2026 9:03 am

In the landmark Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress cracked down hard on repeated attacks on criminal judgments by state prisoners. It also cracked down on such attacks by federal prisoners, but whether the rules for federal prisoners are quite as severe as those for state prisoners is not clear from the language of the statute. Today the U.S. Supreme Court decided two lingering questions on the state-federal distinction in Bowe v. United States. The defendant won on both points.

The outcome is not too surprising. The Government agreed with the defendant on one of the points, and the court had to appoint an amicus to argue in support of the lower court decision. It is an honor to receive this kind of appointment, but victory is rare.

The crackdown on state prisoners is found in 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). Subdivision (1) flatly bars any do-over of a claim made in a previous habeas corpus petition. Subdivision (2) allows new claims, not previously made, only under very limited circumstances. Subdivision (3) requires a state prisoner seeking to file a second or successive petition to first get permission from the court of appeals, and paragraph (3)(E) forbids petitions for rehearing (by either the panel or full court of appeals) or certiorari (in the Supreme Court) to review the decision on whether to grant it.

Federal prisoners file under a different statute, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Subdivision (h) is the repeated attack crackdown. It requires a second or successive motion to be “certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain” either newly discovered evidence proving innocence or a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law. The distinction between do-overs and new claims in section 2244(b)(1) and (2) is absent. Does the language “as provided in section 2244” incorporate that section’s flat bar on all do-overs? Does it incorporate the bar on Supreme Court review of the certification decision? No and no. Continue reading . . .

Supreme Court Refuses to Lift Bar on President Using National Guard in Illinois

by · Dec 23, 2025 3:27 pm

Today the U.S. Supreme Court issued a brief decision in Trump v. Illinois, No. 25A443. The Court held that 10 U.S.C. § 12406(3) does not authorize the President to federalize the Illinois National Guard for the purpose of protecting federal personnel and property in Illinois.

I noted in this post some problems with that particular statute, including its requirement that orders be issued through the state governor. The Supreme Court’s decision focuses on a different aspect of the statute, the condition that “the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” Today’s opinion holds that the reference to “regular forces” limits the statute to laws that the military can enforce, and those are few and far between given the Posse Comitatus Act.

My previous post noted that using military forces to enforce laws in recalcitrant states is better done under one of the surviving remnants of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.

As is common in these summary cases, the opinion of the court is brief and not designated as authored by any justice. Continue reading . . .

SCOTUS Monday

by · Dec 8, 2025 10:17 am

Today’s big SCOTUS news is the oral argument over whether Congress can prevent the President from firing officials of independent agencies. This has been a big debate in constitutional law going back at least as far as the administration of President Andrew Johnson (1865-1869). Update: Most observers of the argument expect the Administration position to prevail. See, e.g., this article in the WSJ.

There is far less action in criminal law. The court’s orders list today took no new cases, criminal or civil. Last Friday, the court issued a short list taking up four cases. The most newsworthy of these is the civil case on how broadly to construe the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” In particular, which children born to noncitizen parents are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States? Continue reading . . .

Supreme Court November Arguments

by · Nov 3, 2025 11:32 am

The U.S. Supreme Court’s November argument calendar begins today. It is Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday this week and next except for Veterans’ Day, next Tuesday.

Here are the criminal and law-enforcement-related civil cases on the docket:

Today, Nov. 3: Rico v. United States.  Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

Next Monday, Nov. 10: Landor v. La. Dept. Corrections:  Whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.

Next Wednesday, Nov. 12: Fernandez v. United States:  Whether a combination of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant a discretionary sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(a) can include reasons that may also be alleged as grounds for vacatur of a sentence under 28 U. S. C. §2255.

Next Wednesday, Nov. 12: Rutherford v. United States and Carter v. United States:  Nonretroactive changes in sentencing law as grounds for sentence reduction. Continue reading . . .

Guns and Drug Users

by · Oct 20, 2025 8:54 am

This morning the U.S. Supreme Court took up yet another Second Amendment case, United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234.

The wide-ranging federal gun control statute (18 U.S.C. § 922) prohibits gun possession by, among many others, “(g) … any person … (3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)).”

Does that law sweep too broadly? The federal courts of appeals are divided. Continue reading . . .

Restitution and Ex Post Facto

by · Oct 15, 2025 10:00 am

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument on whether a restitution order under the federal Mandatory Victim Restitution Act is a criminal sanction, subject to the constitutional prohibition against retroactive legislation in the Ex Post Facto Clause. The case is Ellingburg v. United States, No. 24-482.

The legislation and its history provide enough indications that Congress intended a criminal sanction that the Solicitor General agreed with the defendant, and the court appointed an amicus curiae (friend of the court) to argue in support of the court of appeals’ judgment. Appointed amici do not often prevail in this situation, although it does happen. Not likely in this case. Continue reading . . .

U.S. Supreme Court Arguments This Week — Habeas Corpus

by · Oct 13, 2025 3:51 pm

The U.S. Supreme Court has a two-day argument week this week, as today is Columbus Day. Three of the four cases are criminal cases, but none is a blockbuster. We have one case on habeas corpus, one on restitution and retroactivity, and one on the Fourth Amendment and emergency entry to houses. I will discuss the habeas corpus case in this post.

Bowe v. United States, No. 24-5438, on tomorrow’s (Tuesday’s) calendar, relates to a problem interpreting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) with regard to successive petitions by federal versus state prisoners. An unusual aspect of the case, as far as Supreme Court habeas corpus cases go, is that the petitioner is actually correct, in my opinion. The Solicitors General of both the current and previous administrations think so too on one of the questions, so a special amicus has been appointed to argue in support of the lower court decision. Continue reading . . .

Standing Case in the Supreme Court

by · Oct 10, 2025 11:26 am

One of the requirements to file a civil suit in federal court is “standing.” That is, the plaintiff must have a sufficient interest in the subject matter. Just being against a law on principle is not enough. Determining what interests are sufficient has been a long-standing problem, and the rules are sometimes loosened when they operate, in practice, to completely immunize questionably constitutional laws from any challenge. The case of Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections, which was argued in the U.S. Supreme Court on Wednesday, is a standing case.

CJLF has been involved in standing battles in our work on behalf of victims of crime. When we challenge the early release of a murderer or rapist on behalf of a victim or victim’s family, we are regularly met with an objection that the victim has no standing. California Attorney General Rob Bonta has fought us tooth and claw on this, although he is much milder in his objections to third parties seeking to help murderers. (See pp. 14-15 of this brief.) Continue reading . . .