Is Murder a Violent Offense?

To anyone with common sense, the title of this post seems to be a contender for the most absurd question that can possibly be asked. Yet, believe it or not, the U. S. Supreme Court today took up a case that asks that question, Delligatti v. United States, No. 23-825.

According to the government brief on the question of whether to take the case up, defendant Salvatore Delligatti was “an associate in the Genovese Crime Family,” who was hired to murder someone and then subcontracted the job. The plot failed when the police were alerted and arrested the subs. Among other crimes, Delligatti was charged with gang-related attempted murder in violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, and “carrying a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

Delligatti was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 25 years in prison, of which 5 years were for the § 924 gun charge. He argued in the trial court and on appeal that murder as defined in New York is not a “crime of violence” within the definition of § 924(c) because that definition requires physical force, and it is possible to commit murder in New York by failure to act when one has a duty to act, which does not involve physical force.

Note that Delligatti is not claiming that the crime he actually committed did not involve an attempt to use physical force and indeed deadly force. It’s just that the crime as defined in statute could possibly be committed without it, his argument goes.

Here is the question presented as phrased in the government’s brief.

Whether attempted murder, in violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(5), qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3).*

As the difference between murder and attempted murder is not material to the case, the case really does present the question of whether murder is a violent crime.

Here is the question as phrased in the defendant’s petition, phrased generally to avoid the word “murder”:

Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

But as phrased it still includes murder, which is what this case is about.

The root cause of this insanity is the “categorical approach” that just looks at the definitions of crimes in their broadest possible terms, rather than what the defendant actually did. There have been many calls to abandon that approach. See this post. In this case, the government is not asking for that step, making it very unlikely the Court will do it.

Congress should fix the problem, as noted in the previous post. But it is not likely to this year, for the umpteenth year. At some point, the Supreme Court needs to stop waiting and fix this intolerable situation. It may not be in this case, but it needs to happen.

* Why the Solicitor General does not use section symbols for statutes like everyone else does is an unsolved mystery.