Criminal Witch-Hunting

When does the present witch-hunt atmosphere cross the line from merely deplorable into criminal? A Vermont school board may have crossed the line. They have removed a school principal from her duties, put her on administrative leave, and stated a determination that “she will no longer lead our school.” That is, they have stated an intent to remove her from her position permanently. See this press release. And what was the principal’s offense that warranted this action? She posted on her personal Facebook page, not a school page, a statement refusing to grovel in front of the Black Lives Matter movement and endorse everything they do and demand. In my opinion, this is a crime under federal civil rights law, 18 U.S.C. § 242.

Here is the statement that Tiffany Riley posted on her Facebook page:

“I firmly believe that Black Lives Matter, but I DO NOT agree with the coercive measures taken to get to this point across; some of which are falsified in an attempt to prove a point. While I want to get behind BLM, I do not think people should be made to feel they have to choose black race over human race. While I understand the urgency to feel compelled to advocate for black lives, what about our fellow law enforcement? What about all others who advocate for and demand equity for all? Just because I don’t walk around with a BLM sign should not mean I am a racist.”

The board’s press release does not indicate whether it was Ms. Riley’s personal page or a school page. They are apparently clueless that it matters, but it does matter a great deal. This Associated Press story on the Burlington Free Press site reports that it was her personal page.

There are a couple of important distinctions in employee speech cases. First, the school district is a government entity. Its actions against employees are state actions, and the First Amendment applies. Private employers are not subject to the First Amendment, but other laws may apply.

Second, while even government employers have considerable latitude in regulating speech on the job, they cannot prevent employees from speaking out on matters of public interest in forums outside the job. The Supreme Court established this long ago in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574-575 (1968).

In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment. Since no such showing has been made in this case regarding appellant’s letter [to a newspaper editor], see Appendix, infra, his dismissal for writing it cannot be upheld and the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court must, accordingly, be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

As with many Warren Court decisions, the sweeping language of Pickering has been qualified since. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), the Supreme Court removed from the protection of the Pickering rule “speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.”

In school or at a school-sponsored event, schools have considerable control over the speech of students and teachers. In Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), the Supreme Court held that a school could discipline a student for holding up a banner with a pro-drug message at a school-sponsored event.

So is this case more like Pickering or more like Garcetti and Morse? It’s not even close, in my view. Posting on a personal Facebook page is not part of a principal’s duties. (Unlike my posting on this blog, which is part of my job.) It is a public statement that is indistinguishable, for First Amendment purposes, from Pickering’s letter to the editor.

The board is clearly wrong as a matter of First Amendment law. Is their wrongness clear enough to violate the federal statute?

The Supreme Court explained in United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264 (1997), “Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) ‘willfully’ and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” The willfulness requirement and the constitutional requirement of due process require that a defendant have fair warning that his conduct was a violation at the time of the act. The protection is essentially equivalent to that given to public officials in civil cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the qualified immunity doctrine. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002).

However, as the Lanier and Hope cases explain, it is not essential to have a case on point if one’s conduct is outside any “gray zone” where the scope of a rule depends on the application of a general standard to particular facts.

“In sum, as with civil liability under § 1983 or Bivens, all that can usefully be said about criminal liability under § 242 is that it may be imposed for deprivation of a constitutional right if, but only if, ‘in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [under the Constitution is] apparent,’ Anderson, supra, at 640. Where it is, the constitutional requirement of fair warning is satisfied.” Lanier, 520 U.S., at 271-272.

In light of pre-existing law, is the First Amendment violation “apparent”? It is in my opinion. Assuming the AP report is correct that this was Ms. Riley’s personal Facebook page, there does not appear to be any credible argument that the post was official duty speech under Garcetti rather than expression on a matter of public interest under Pickering.

Absent any additional facts that would change the above analysis, the board’s action is a criminal violation of civil rights. The U.S. Attorney should proceed with prosecution under § 242 or possibly for conspiracy to violate civil rights under § 241.