Antecedents and consequences of de-policing

De-policing is a term that refers to a reduction in proactive policing strategies, and it tends to coincide with officers’ fears of becoming ‘the next viral incident’ and/or criminal prosecution. The de-policing effect seemed to start around 2014 after a viral shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and hence, it is sometimes referred to as the “Ferguson Effect.” Since then, increased circulation of viral videos from body-worn camera footage and cell phone videos on the internet seem to have exacerbated the effect. The Manhattan Institute released a report recently discussing the research on de-policing effects and qualitative findings from interviews with police officers, and main findings indicated that de-policing seems to be associated with low police morale/motivation and fear of becoming involved in a viral use of force incident. Officer morale also decreases when officers feel less supported by their communities.

Simultaneously, there has been criticism of officers pulling back and being less proactive, saying that it is correlated to recent increases in homicides and violent crime. On September 27, 2021, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) released preliminary findings that revealed that violent crime is up, with a violent crime rate of 387.8 per 100,000 — a 5.2% increase when compared with 2019 rates (380.8 per 100,000). The violent crime increase appears to be driven by increases in aggravated assaults (+12.0%) and murders (+29.4%), whereas rates for other violent crimes (i.e., robbery, rape) decreased from 2019 to 2020 (-9.3% and -12.0%, respectively). While overall crime rates are lower than they have been in previous years, homicides and shootings are higher than normal, and this trend appears to be continuing into 2021. As stated above, many argue that the “de-policing effect” increases violent crime in certain cities. Additionally, the “defund the police” movement does not help this problem, as it simply limits law enforcement access to technology and/or other resources that could effectively reduce crime.

Unfortunately though, we have seen less police proactivity in the recent months (i.e., the de-policing effect), which has been exacerbated by COVID-19 as well as the “defund the police” movement. Additionally, de-funding the police would both decrease law enforcement’s abilities to engage in predictive policing efforts discussed above. It is likely that the police could do their job better with more resources, particularly if they were dedicated to data-driven policing, yet these topics remain contentious in the political arena.

For example, one thing we can do to better understand crime patterns is to assess them at the micro-level (using data), and subsequently inform predictive policing and/or surveillance efforts. For example, hot-spots policing incorporates place-based and time-variant factors to predict the approximate time of day and area where crime occurs (i.e., a ‘hot spot’). The idea is that if we can predict where crime is likely to occur, police can be more proactive in preventing crime. Intelligence-led policing is similar to hot-spots in that it is data-driven, but it focuses less on place/time and more on social networks to predict what types of offenders are more likely to commit certain types of crime. Third-party policing is another type of intelligence-led policing that draws on the social control mechanisms held by other government and community actors — such as subway workers or property owners, for example. These community actors can then act as “eyes and ears” for the police and also impose their own legal levers to help control crime. All of these approaches have been evaluated to some extent with promising effects. For more information on the effectiveness of various policing strategies, see CrimeSolutions.gov, where results from various studies are collated, reviewed, and given ratings regarding their efficacy. While data-driven policing strategies are not completely without unintended effects, research suggests they are promising in preventing crime.

In general, police morale, motivation, and confidence are likely causal mechanism contributing to de-policing. As mentioned in the Manhattan Institute report, police morale and motivation is likely driven by factors such as whether one feels appreciated, perceived fairness and legitimacy of their organization, relationships with supervisors, and confidence in their training. As discussed in the Manhattan Institute report, a study by Nix and Wolfe (2016) found that sheriffs deputies in Ferguson were significantly more likely to report reduced motivation following Michael Brown’s death due to negative publicity and reduced appreciation for the police. However, officers’ relationships with their supervisors and confidence in their organization as a whole seemed to somewhat mitigate this effect, especially when supervisors were less sensitive to public pressure, according to another study by Nix and Wolfe (2018). Officers who were supported by their supervisors also reported reduced emotional distress and felt more confident in their interactions with the public.

But how do we balance police accountability and transparency with police proactivity? Qualified immunity should (and often does protect) officers from being prosecuted after poorly handled use-of-force incidents. Thus, many argue though that qualified immunity provides no accountability for police and should be eliminated. Others postulate that the elimination of qualified immunity could also contribute to de-policing because officers are terrified of being prosecuted (regardless of whether they are acting within their policy/training). In fact, qualified immunity only applies to officers who are acting within the scope of their training — meaning that when poorly handled use-of-force incidents go viral, it is more indicative of a training issue rather than an officer-level issue.  For reform, the real change needs to come from changing training and also policies in departments. Unfortunately there is no nationally-recognized, universal policy, training, or guidelines that is used to govern police organizations.

Related to training, officer motivation may also be affected by whether officers feel confident in their skills to effectively handle situations. In some respects, training may be able to help improve an officer’s confidence in handling certain scenarios, such as de-escalation skills, communication skills, and physical defense skills (and their confidence in implementing them). There is limited research on the impact of physical exercise and martial arts on police performance, as well as programs that work on distress tolerance and interpersonal effectiveness, but some aspects are included in other areas of police training that might be promising. Confidence in handling law enforcement-citizen encounters can be enhanced using certain types of training aimed at distress tolerance, communication skills, and operational skills (e.g. de-escalation, crisis intervention training, threat assessment training). These trainings could help officers handle situations without fatally injuring people (and thus protect relationships with the community), while also holding officers accountable to  a higher standard of training and maintaining qualified immunity.

De-escalation trainings focus on slowing down potentially volatile situations and reducing the immediacy of threat during these encounters. The goal of de-escalation is to resolve the situation without using force or with a reduction in the severity of force used. Communication skills and operational skills are the two major types of de-escalation techniques. Verbal techniques cover things like interpersonal effectiveness, conflict resolution, and empathic listening skills. Non-verbal techniques emphasize things like giving undivided attention or being mindful of tone of voice. Many of these concepts are also covered in procedural justice and social interaction trainings, and have been found to improve citizen and officer encounters.

Communication is especially key when it comes to engaging with persons with mental illness or those in crisis. Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) is a well-known knowledge- and scenario-based training for officers that teaches them how to recognize and respond to people in crisis. A 2019 research review found mixed results regarding the benefits of CIT on officer/citizen injuries and use of force, however, it does appear to improve officers’ perceptions of their interactions with mentally ill people. So far, the research on CIT is promising but still inconclusive.

Other programs related to mentally ill persons include co-responder programs (where officers work alongside specially trained civilian personnel to respond to crises), or mobile crisis units (which are specially-trained entities separate from the police who respond to crisis). Research reviews from 2018 and 2020 have shown that co-responder programs can reduce the amount of police time spent on mental health calls, increase access to services for mentally ill persons, and decrease repeat calls. Unfortunately though, both research reviews explain how frameworks of co-responder programs vary greatly, making it difficult to know which framework is the most effective. Another approach is disability awareness training, such as FRDAT (First Responder Disability Awareness Training) based in New York. FRDAT offers resources on how to recognize and communicate with people who are intellectually or physically disabled. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it helps to decrease use of force, increase officer awareness of mental health symptoms, and increase their efficiency and confidence in handling mental health calls. However, it has yet to be rigorously evaluated.

When communication skills are not appropriate for the situation, an officer may need to employ operational techniques. Operational techniques include skills such as using distance and cover to create time, tactical positioning/repositioning, and potentially calling additional resources to the scene. The officer’s goal when using operational techniques is to not only protect himself but also create additional attempts to de-escalate. Operational techniques involve critical decision-making skills like knowing whether it is safe to ‘tactically pause’ and engage verbally with a suspect. For example, in a rapidly evolving scenario involving a person with a knife, an officer can use an operational skill such as tactical positioning/tactical pause to create distance between himself and the subject, which may allow for another verbal de-escalation attempt. Sometimes, it will not be safe to tactically pause and an officer will still need to apply force. However, they can still opt for a less-lethal use of force, particularly if the subject does not appear to have a firearm (as an aside, this is were martial arts/jiu-jistu alternatives might be helpful, but they have yet to be rigorously evaluated). Should a use of force eventually occur, operational techniques can also help an officer resolve the situation without resorting to lethal force.

For agencies with budgetary constrictions, the Police Executive Research Forum has a variety of free resources, including a range of modules related to critical decision-making, crisis recognition, communications skills, and operational tactics. Their program, ICAT, was evaluated in Louisville, Kentucky and Camden, New Jersey, and both had promising results. The Louisville study showed significant reductions in use of force, citizen injuries, and officer injuries, while the Camden study found reductions in serious force events. The ICAT training also seems to increase officer confidence in handling volatile law enforcement-citizen encounters, particularly with mentally ill persons.

The de-policing effect seems to have worsened as increasing numbers of viral videos from body-worn camera (BWC) footage and cell phones circulate on the internet, as these types of events can decrease officer morale and motivation. However, the de-policing effect seems to be moderated based on an officer’s confidence in their training, his relationships with his supervisor, perceptions of the organization, and personality characteristics such as distress tolerance. Relatedly, there are strategies to consider that could target these mechanisms to ultimately help police balance effectiveness and transparency.

Deep fixes to policing are complex and relate mostly to officer morale as well as departmental policies and training. Unfortunately though, politics are obviously not based on reality; while de-funding the police would help politicians appease the public and navigate public outcry, it might decrease public safety. In other words, de-funding might not be the greatest idea because law enforcement does need funding to engage in effective, evidence-based policing strategies as well as use available technology to assist in reducing crime and clear cases. Thus, we need to be cautious in regard to the laws we pass and policies implemented in various law enforcement agencies. For example, police departments (if budgets allow) could include trainings or explore ways to increase police morale and motivation.