Author: Kent Scheidegger

Evading Accountability for Injustice

In most states, the power to grant a pardon or commute a sentence is vested in the governor, sometimes with a check on the power by another body. Parole boards can also shorten sentences, but in most states the members are appointed by the governor. Although far from perfect, these conventional arrangements do provide some semblance of accountability for unjust, undeserved reductions of punishment for major crimes. Even when not running for reelection, governors often have their eyes on another office and tend to be reluctant to anger voters with excessive sentence reductions.

Now in Virginia there is a bill to take the heat off the governor by greatly expanding the parole board and vesting appointment authority for the new seats in two legislators: the Speaker of the House of Delegates and the chairman of the Senate Rules Committee. These office holders directly face the voters of only their own districts, often “safe” ones, and they can be much less concerned with angering the voters of the state as a whole.

This post at Liberty Unyielding denounces the proposal. It is reproduced below with permission. Continue reading . . .

Emergency Entry and the Fourth Amendment

Here is a bit deeper dive on Case v. Montana, the U.S. Supreme Court emergency entry case that I noted briefly this morning. Although the high court affirmed the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court, it did so with a more limiting standard than the state court used. Three standards have been used by various courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court chose the middle one. The standard is unique to emergency cases, rejecting both looser and more restrictive standards derived from criminal investigation cases.

The emergency in this case was created when Case’s former girlfriend reported that Case had said during a phone call that he intended to kill himself. This was followed by a click that may have been a gun being cocked, a pop that may have been a discharge, and then dead air. This information, combined with Case’s history, make it hard to see how the state could have lost this case under any standard. The strong possibility that he had already shot himself but might be still alive and in need of emergency aid to save his life seems compelling.

The Montana Supreme Court thought that the “community caretaking” function of the police permits entry of a home in emergency situations “when ‘objective, specific and articulable facts’ would lead an ‘experienced officer [to] suspect’ that a person inside ‘is in need of help or is in peril.’ ” That is the minimal standard needed for the police to briefly detain someone on the street, known as a “Terry stop” for the 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio. The defendant wanted the much more restrictive standard needed for search warrants: probable cause. He cited cases from the D.C., Second, and Eleventh Circuits supporting that view.

In the 2006 case of Brigham City v. Stuart, the Supreme Court set out a rule for entry to a home in an emergency: “Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” Is the Brigham City standard equivalent to either the Terry standard or the probable cause standard? Continue reading . . .

SCOTUS Decides Double Punishment and Emergency Entry Cases

The U.S. Supreme Court decided two criminal cases today. In Barrett v. United States, the court decided that if a single act violates two provisions of a notoriously complex federal firearms statute the defendant can only be punished for one of them. In Case v. Montana the court confirmed that entry into a home for the purpose of emergency assistance requires only “an “objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone inside needs emergency assistance.” Probable cause is not required. “The probable-cause requirement is rooted in, and derives its meaning from, the criminal context, and we decline to transplant it to this different one.”

Both decisions are unanimous, although Justice Gorsuch declines to join one subpart of the Barrett opinion.

SCOTUS Softens Limits on Repeat Petitions by Federal Prisoners (But Not Much)

In the landmark Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress cracked down hard on repeated attacks on criminal judgments by state prisoners. It also cracked down on such attacks by federal prisoners, but whether the rules for federal prisoners are quite as severe as those for state prisoners is not clear from the language of the statute. Today the U.S. Supreme Court decided two lingering questions on the state-federal distinction in Bowe v. United States. The defendant won on both points.

The outcome is not too surprising. The Government agreed with the defendant on one of the points, and the court had to appoint an amicus to argue in support of the lower court decision. It is an honor to receive this kind of appointment, but victory is rare.

The crackdown on state prisoners is found in 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). Subdivision (1) flatly bars any do-over of a claim made in a previous habeas corpus petition. Subdivision (2) allows new claims, not previously made, only under very limited circumstances. Subdivision (3) requires a state prisoner seeking to file a second or successive petition to first get permission from the court of appeals, and paragraph (3)(E) forbids petitions for rehearing (by either the panel or full court of appeals) or certiorari (in the Supreme Court) to review the decision on whether to grant it.

Federal prisoners file under a different statute, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Subdivision (h) is the repeated attack crackdown. It requires a second or successive motion to be “certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain” either newly discovered evidence proving innocence or a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law. The distinction between do-overs and new claims in section 2244(b)(1) and (2) is absent. Does the language “as provided in section 2244” incorporate that section’s flat bar on all do-overs? Does it incorporate the bar on Supreme Court review of the certification decision? No and no. Continue reading . . .

Supreme Court Refuses to Lift Bar on President Using National Guard in Illinois

Today the U.S. Supreme Court issued a brief decision in Trump v. Illinois, No. 25A443. The Court held that 10 U.S.C. § 12406(3) does not authorize the President to federalize the Illinois National Guard for the purpose of protecting federal personnel and property in Illinois.

I noted in this post some problems with that particular statute, including its requirement that orders be issued through the state governor. The Supreme Court’s decision focuses on a different aspect of the statute, the condition that “the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” Today’s opinion holds that the reference to “regular forces” limits the statute to laws that the military can enforce, and those are few and far between given the Posse Comitatus Act.

My previous post noted that using military forces to enforce laws in recalcitrant states is better done under one of the surviving remnants of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.

As is common in these summary cases, the opinion of the court is brief and not designated as authored by any justice. Continue reading . . .

Meese Institute at AAF

Former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese III is a long-time friend and advisor to CJLF. His namesake legal institute has long been part of the Heritage Foundation, but he has announced a new one at Advancing American Freedom, an organization headed by former Vice President Mike Pence. AAF’s press release quotes Mr. Meese:

I am proud to announce Advancing American Freedom as the home for the new Edwin Meese III Institute for the Rule of Law. AAF has already established itself as a leader in the conservative movement.

I am confident that the lawyers and staff in the Meese Institute will continue to play a leading role in advancing the conservative legal movement in terms of their scholarship, and by working with allies to achieve our mutual objectives, educating the general public about important legal issues, helping to train the next generation of conservative lawyers, and defending the Constitution and rule of law.

The WSJ has this article. Continue reading . . .

Virginia legislation could release dangerous murderers and tie the hands of the parole board

In the wake of the November election, with the governor’s veto threat removed, the Virginia legislature is proceeding to pass California-style legislation that takes soft-on-crime to new levels. Hans Bader has this post with the above title at Liberty Unyielding.

In a nutshell, the bill would make the crime that a prison inmate committed irrelevant to the parole decision for those inmates who were under 18 at the time they committed major felonies. Continue reading . . .

SCOTUS Monday

Today’s big SCOTUS news is the oral argument over whether Congress can prevent the President from firing officials of independent agencies. This has been a big debate in constitutional law going back at least as far as the administration of President Andrew Johnson (1865-1869). Update: Most observers of the argument expect the Administration position to prevail. See, e.g., this article in the WSJ.

There is far less action in criminal law. The court’s orders list today took no new cases, criminal or civil. Last Friday, the court issued a short list taking up four cases. The most newsworthy of these is the civil case on how broadly to construe the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” In particular, which children born to noncitizen parents are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States? Continue reading . . .

Supreme Court November Arguments

The U.S. Supreme Court’s November argument calendar begins today. It is Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday this week and next except for Veterans’ Day, next Tuesday.

Here are the criminal and law-enforcement-related civil cases on the docket:

Today, Nov. 3: Rico v. United States.  Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

Next Monday, Nov. 10: Landor v. La. Dept. Corrections:  Whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.

Next Wednesday, Nov. 12: Fernandez v. United States:  Whether a combination of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant a discretionary sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(a) can include reasons that may also be alleged as grounds for vacatur of a sentence under 28 U. S. C. §2255.

Next Wednesday, Nov. 12: Rutherford v. United States and Carter v. United States:  Nonretroactive changes in sentencing law as grounds for sentence reduction. Continue reading . . .

Federalist Society Convention — National Guard in Cities

The Federalist Society’s National Lawyers Convention is this week, Thursday through Saturday. It is being held at the Washington Hilton, having outgrown its traditional venue at the Mayflower Hotel. Many of the panels will be live-streamed for free.

Update 11/21: The panel recordings were offline for a time while they cleaned up the audio. The are accessible once again.

The panel for the Criminal Law Practice Group is “Crime, Cities, and the Guard: The Legal and Policy Dimensions of Domestic Troop Deployment.” Cully Stimson of the Heritage Foundation is on the panel. Fifth Circuit Judge Edith Jones is the moderator. The scheduled time is 3:45-5:00 EST pm Thursday, 12:45-2:00 pm PST.

Continue reading . . .