Author: Kym Stapleton

Judicial Factfinding, Multiple Sex Offense Convictions and Consecutive Sentences

by · May 25, 2023 4:18 pm

Over a period of 10 months, Edgar Sandoval Catarino sexually abused his 9-year old cousin on multiple occasions.  He was charged with 8 counts of forcible lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (Penal Code §288(a)) .  Each charge alleged an identical range of dates during which these offenses may have occurred.  A jury subsequently convicted him on 6 of the counts and the verdict also included the same range of dates alleged on each count, but did not further specify on what dates each of the crimes took place.  At sentencing, the court found that each conviction occurred on separate occasions and sentenced him to full, consecutive terms for each pursuant to Penal Code section 667.6(d).  Catarino argued that because the jury did not make specific findings that each of his convictions constituted separate incidents occurring on separate occasions, it violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  The California Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld his full, consecutive sentences this morning in People v. Catarino (S271828) Continue reading . . .

The “True Threats” Doctrine

by · Apr 21, 2023 2:15 pm

On Wednesday the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Counterman v. Colorado, No. 22-138 (transcript here, audio here).

The issue in this case involves how courts should determine what constitutes a “true threat.”  True threats are not protected by the First Amendment.  The question before the Court is whether a state may define speech to be a “true threat” if it would be regarded by a reasonable person as a true threat, or whether the First Amendment requires a state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the speaker subjectively intended the communication to be a threat.

In this case, Billy Raymond Counterman, was convicted of stalking and was sentenced to 4.5 years in prison for sending thousands of private Facebook messages to a local singer/songwriter named C.W. C.W. found the private messages to be “weird” and “creepy” and did not respond to any of them. She blocked Counterman from her Facebook accounts, but he created new accounts and continued to message her. As time went on without response from C.W., Counterman’s messages became more angry and alarming, causing C.W. to become extremely fearful and scared. Counterman also alluded to making physical sightings of C.W. in public. Continue reading . . .

The Riddles of Harmless Error and Habeas Corpus – Part II

by · Oct 5, 2021 7:22 pm

Today the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in Brown v. Davenport, No. 20-826 (transcript here; audio here).

The issue in this case involves the standard of review federal habeas courts must apply when reviewing a state court’s determination of harmless error. Davenport was partially shackled during his trial for first-degree murder. On direct appeal, the state appellate courts found that his partial shackling was unconstitutional, but was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard announced in Chapman v. California (1968). Continue reading . . .

Marsh Appeal Dismissed

by · Sep 8, 2021 11:28 am

This morning the California Court of Appeal (3rd Appellate District) dismissed Daniel Marsh’s appeal in an unpublished opinion (found here). A few weeks ago I wrote a blog post that detailed this appeal’s convoluted procedural history (here).   The Court of Appeal agreed that the juvenile court’s reinstatement of the original 2014 criminal judgment was final before SB 1391 went into effect.  Because it “did not constitute a new judgment from which to appeal,” the Court of Appeal found it was not appealable, and thus “the appeal must be dismissed.”

The Current Status of The People v. Daniel William Marsh

by · Aug 20, 2021 4:18 pm

In April of 2013, Daniel Marsh was 15 years old when he broke into Chip Northup and Claudia Maupin‘s condominium in the middle of the night and heinously murdered them as they slept.  His case was directly filed in adult criminal court and, in 2014, he was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree murder with special circumstances.  The trial court imposed a sentence of 52 years to life.  The Northup and Maupin families found relief in the verdict and sentence and believed Marsh would be locked up for a very long time.  Unfortunately, their relief was short lived and their fight for justice had just begun.  Continue reading . . .

“Affordable Bail” Does Not Protect Public and Victim Safety

by · Mar 26, 2021 4:41 pm

If an arrestee can be “admitted to bail,” (meaning pretrial release is not precluded), California law authorizes four different methods of pretrial release, only one of which has a monetary requirement. Those four methods include (1) money bail; (2) release on own recognizance (“OR”); (3) OR under supervision; and (4) pretrial diversion. At an arrestee’s first court appearance, a judge will decide if he or she should be released on OR (with or without supervision) or on money bail.

The California Supreme Court’s Humphrey decision announced yesterday initially acknowledged OR as a type of pretrial release, but then they completely ignored it as they delved right into the unconstitutional disparities of money bail. The court also glossed over the fact that Humphrey requested OR release under supervision twice and was denied twice. The trial court denied his request for OR release due to the seriousness of the crimes committed (first-degree residential robbery, first-degree residential burglary, inflicting non-great bodily injury on an elder or dependent adult, and theft from an elder or dependent adult PLUS three prior strikes), the vulnerability of the victim (a 79-year-old man), and on the recommendation against OR release from pretrial service’s Public Safety Assessment Report. In addition to public safety concerns, the trial court was also concerned that Humphrey was a “flight risk.”

What is OR release? Had the court taken the time to examine it in a bit more detail, the public would better understand that it is a discretionary non-monetary alternative to cash bail contained in Article I, section 12 of the California Constitution. Continue reading . . .

Courts Must Consider an Arrestee’s Ability to Pay Money Bail in California

by · Mar 25, 2021 4:10 pm

This morning the California Supreme Court held that trial courts must consider an arrestee’s ability to pay when setting the amount of money bail in the case of In re Humphrey (S247278).

Humphrey, a repeat offender, was charged with robbery and burglary. Bail was initially set at $600,000, then later reduced to $350,000.  Humphrey’s request for pretrial release on his own recognizance (“OR”) without financial conditions was denied because the trial court found he was a danger to public safety and a “flight risk.”  Humphrey was unable to post bail and remained detained pretrial.  Humphrey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court’s failure to inquire into his financial circumstances and to not consider less restrictive alternatives to money bail was a violation of his constitutional rights.  The California Attorney General initially opposed Humphrey’s position.  However, the AG later changed his position and agreed that Humphrey was entitled to a new bail hearing stating that he would “no longer defend ‘any application of the bail law that does not take into consideration a person’s ability to pay, or alternative methods of ensuring a person’s appearance at trial.'”    CJLF filed a brief (found here) arguing that public and victim safety, and whether the arrestee is considered a “flight risk,” are the primary considerations to be evaluated by a court when initially deciding whether an arrestee is eligible for pretrial release, and, if eligible, what type of pretrial release is appropriate under the circumstances—money bail or release on OR without financial conditions.  It was CJLF’s position that to release Humphrey on an amount that he could afford, or on other less restrictive alternatives, would essentially permit his release on his OR, which is contrary to the trial court’s findings regarding his danger to victim and public safety. Continue reading . . .

Legislative Amendments to California Voter Enacted Law

by · Feb 25, 2021 3:25 pm

This morning the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute passed by the state legislature (SB 1391) that prohibits 14- and 15-year-old criminal offenders from being prosecuted as adults.  In the case of in O.G. v. Superior Court (S259011), the issue was whether the California Legislature unconstitutionally amended the statutory provisions of Proposition 57 when it enacted SB 1391.  Prop. 57 was voted into law by a majority of California voters in 2016.  The ballot measure eliminated a District Attorney’s ability to directly file criminal charges against individuals under age 18 in adult court.  The measure instead gave juvenile court judges the sole authority to decide whether violent juveniles ages 14 and older should be prosecuted as adults only after conducting a full evidentiary hearing in the juvenile court.  In 2018, former Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 1391 into law.  SB 1391 prohibits 14 and 15 year olds from being criminally prosecuted as adults regardless of the crime committed.  CJLF filed a brief (found here) arguing that SB 1391 unconstitutionally amended Prop. 57.  Today the California Supreme Court held that SB 1391 “is fully consistent with and furthers” the intent and purpose of Prop. 57 and upheld the statutory amendment.

Continue reading . . .

Who decides if a teen killer should be tried as an adult?

by · Dec 2, 2020 10:53 am

On Tuesday morning, the California Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of O.G. v. Superior Court (S259011).  The issue is whether the California Legislature unconstitutionally amended the statutory provisions of Proposition 57 when it enacted SB 1391.  Prop. 57 was voted into law by a majority of California voters in 2016.  The ballot measure eliminated a District Attorney’s ability to directly file criminal charges against individuals under age 18 in adult court.  The measure instead gave juvenile court judges the sole authority to decide whether violent juveniles ages 14 and older should be prosecuted as adults only after conducting a full evidentiary hearing in the juvenile court.  In 2018, former Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 1391 into law.  SB 1391 prohibits 14 and 15 year olds from being criminally prosecuted as adults regardless of the crime committed.  In a nut shell, voter enacted Prop. 57 gives juvenile court judges the sole authority to decide whether juveniles (ages 14 and older) should be prosecuted as adults and legislature enacted SB 1391 prohibits 14 and 15 years olds from being prosecuted as adults.  SB 1391 (the legislature) takes away what Prop. 57 (the voters) authorized.  CJLF filed a brief (found here) arguing that SB 1391 unconstitutionally amended Prop. 57.

Continue reading . . .

DNA evidence solves another cold case

by · Oct 23, 2020 1:51 pm

On July 31, 1979, a 45-year old mother of four named Dolores Rocha Wulff mysteriously disappeared in the middle of the night with only the clothes she was wearing from her home in Woodland, Yolo County, California.  Five weeks later, a torso was discovered by two fishermen 50-miles away in the Benicia Bay.  Given the limited scientific technology at the time, the torso was never positively identified.  She became known as “Jane Doe 16.”

Immediately after Dolores vanished, the close knit Rocha family searched for her extensively.  They knew that she would not have simply walked out of her children’s lives on her own accord.  Her husband, Carl Wulff Sr., was looked at as the prime suspect.  He was the last one to see her alive and a search of his car produced a bloodstained blanket.  Almost five years after she disappeared without a trace, Carl Sr. was charged with her murder.  But, his case was subsequently dismissed for a lack of evidence.  Carl Sr. died in 2005. Continue reading . . .