Category: U.S. Supreme Court

Revoking Federal Supervised Release

by · Jun 20, 2025 9:10 am

There is no parole, as such, in the federal sentencing system, but a sentence can include a period of “supervised release” following the term of incarceration. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), when imposing the original sentence, a federal judge can consider, among other factors, “the need for the sentence imposed” “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” Can the judge consider that factor when deciding on a revocation of supervised release?

No, the Supreme Court decided today in Esteras v. United States, No. 23-7483. Why not? The simple answer is because Congress said so. The statute on supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), specifies the factors. Many of the factors used to set the initial sentence are included, but that one is conspicuously absent.

So why is there any difficulty at all? Continue reading . . .

Prison Litigation, Administrative Remedies, and Jury Trial

by · Jun 18, 2025 8:41 am

The U.S. Supreme Court handed down five opinions in civil cases this morning. One of them is a law-enforcement-related civil case, a category we keep tabs on at CJLF.

In 1995, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to cut down on the amount of federal court litigation involving prisoners. One requirement of the law, a common one in cases involving government agencies, is that a prisoner must first try any administrative remedies available in the prison system before turning to the courts. The Supreme Court has previously decided that a remedy is not “available” for this purpose if it is unavailable in practice, even if it exists on the books.

So, if a prison guard accused of misconduct blocks the prisoner from the grievance process by destroying his papers, the process would be unavailable, and the prisoner can proceed to federal court. But if that blocking is disputed, who decides if it really happened, the federal judge or a jury? That was the question in Perttu v. Richards, decided today. Continue reading . . .

Privacy for Donors

by · Jun 16, 2025 8:08 am

The U.S. Supreme Court took up two civil cases for full review today. One of them involves privacy for donors to nonprofit organizations. Back in 1958, the Supreme Court decided that protection of donor lists was part of the constitutional freedom of association in NAACP v. Alabama. The case taken up today, First Choice Women’s Resource Centers v. Platkin, AG of NJ, involves procedural issues rather than the scope of the protection.

Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Evasion of Successive Habeas Petition Limit

by · Jun 12, 2025 7:36 am

In 1996, Congress cracked down hard on the then-routine practice of state prisoners filing one habeas corpus petition after another to attack the same criminal judgment. Relitigating the same claim is not allowed at all, and making new claims is severely restricted. Ever since, the defense bar has been trying to poke holes in this barrier, with varying degrees of success.

Today the Supreme Court slammed shut a loophole that had been created by one court of appeals but rejected by most of them. Convicted child abuser Danny Rivers claimed that he could request to amend his habeas corpus petition to add a new claim even after his initial petition had been denied by the district court and was pending on appeal. The unanimous opinion by Justice Jackson holds:

A second-in-time §2254 petition generally qualifies as a second or successive application, triggering the requirements of §2244(b), when an earlier filed petition has been decided on the merits and a judgment exists. Because the Fifth Circuit correctly applied this straightforward rule, we affirm.

Continue reading . . .

Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty, Again

by · Jun 9, 2025 8:33 am

Should people with intellectual disability be exempt from capital punishment? If so, who decides where and how to draw the line? The U.S. Supreme Court opened a can of worms with its 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia that a categorical exemption is constitutionally required. Last Friday* the court decided to look into this can once again, taking up the case of Alabama murderer Joseph Smith. The case is Hamm v. Smith, No. 24-872.

When the Supreme Court announced its decision 23 years ago, it seemed to be constitutionalizing only the yes-or-no decision, leaving the line-drawing to the states. Even while making a dubious finding of consensus on the categorical exemption, the court acknowledged disagreement on how to draw the line. Quoting an earlier decision forbidding execution of insane persons, the opinion said, “we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.”

This holding of Atkins was effectively overruled by later decisions. In the Smith case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has told Alabama it is drawing the line wrong. There are two problems. First, how do you determine the possible range of someone’s “true IQ” when he has multiple test scores? Second, can we declare a person intellectually disabled even though the probability that his true IQ is below 70 is vanishingly small?

Looming over these two questions is a larger question. Do the questions above have right and wrong answers as a matter of federal constitutional law, or should the Supreme Court return to honoring its long-ago, much-violated promise in Atkins that the states would have leeway in these matters? Continue reading . . .

Modifying Federal Sentences

by · May 27, 2025 9:10 am

Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), provides a limited authority for a federal judge to modify a previously imposed term of imprisonment. One of the grounds, in subparagraph (1)(A), is that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” Today the U.S. Supreme Court took up the case of Fernandez v. United States, No. 24-556, to decide if reasons that would support a motion to vacate a sentence constitute grounds for a 3582(c)(1)(A) modification. The motion-to-vacate statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, is Congress’s substitute for habeas corpus for federal prisoners.

Continue reading . . .

Fraud Without Financial Injury

by · May 22, 2025 8:54 am

If a liar lies to induce someone into a deal and the other person suffers no monetary loss, is it still a fraud? Yes, under the federal “wire fraud” statute, the U.S. Supreme Court decided today in Kousisis v. United States, No. 23-909. The high court was unanimous as to that basic rule, but there were some disagreements on scope and the underlying issue in the fraudulent inducement.

The Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation needed some restoration work done, and the federal government was picking up part of the tab. Federal regulations required a “disadvantaged-business program.” Kousisis represented that he would obtain painting supplies from a “disadvantaged” business, but that business was just a pass-through that got paid a fee for processing paperwork for supplies actually purchased elsewhere.

So PennDOT got the services it paid for, but it didn’t get the boost to supposedly disadvantaged business that was expressly made a material term of the contract. Is that fraud? Of course. Regardless of what one thinks of such clauses in government contracts, it was part of the deal. In order to get money, Kousisis made a fraudulent inducement on a term that was material to the other party, and that is all the law requires.

So where is the disagreement? Continue reading . . .

Police Use of Force and the “Moment of Threat”

by · May 15, 2025 10:52 am

The Supreme Court has long held that claims of unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment must be evaluated under the “totality of the circumstances.” Since Illinois v. Gates in 1983, it has rejected categorical rules that confine the assessment. Today the high court decided in Barnes v. Felix that a claim of unlawful use of force against a police officer cannot be confined to the “moment of threat.” Unlawful use of force is considered a seizure and analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.

Today, we reject that approach as improperly narrowing the requisite Fourth Amendment analysis. To assess whether an officer acted reasonably in using force, a court must consider all the relevant circumstances, including facts and events leading up to the climactic moment.

No big surprise there. The decision was unanimous. Continue reading . . .

Dispatch Acquires SCOTUSBlog

by · Apr 26, 2025 10:12 am

SCOTUSblog has been acquired by Dispatch Media. Amy Howe has this post on SCOTUSblog, and Dispatch editor Steve Hayes has this post on the Dispatch.

I am pleased to see that Amy is staying with SCOTUSblog as a member of Dispatch’s team. Her posts on SCOTUSblog and her own blog have long been my go-to source for thorough and unbiased reports on Supreme Court cases that are outside my own field of expertise.

The usual squawkers are squawking that The Dispatch is “right-wing.” See, e.g., this post at Above the Law. But a quick look at The Dispatch’s home page illustrates how meaningless such simplistic designations are. They are certainly not Trump fans. One post is titled “Trump’s Team of Losers.” The Founding Manifesto states, “The goal was to create a place where thoughtful readers can come for conservative, fact-based news and commentary that doesn’t come either through the filter of the mainstream media or the increasingly boosterish media on the right.” That’s a long way from the image usually conjured up by the term “right wing.”

Continue reading . . .

Mixed Ruling in El Salvador Case

by · Apr 11, 2025 12:03 pm

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an order partly granting and partly denying the Department of Homeland Security’s application in the case of the deportation of Kilmar Abrego Garcia to El Salvador, noted in this post Monday. Here is the dispositive paragraph:

The application is granted in part and denied in part, subject to the direction of this order. Due to the administrative stay issued by The Chief Justice, the deadline imposed by the District Court has now passed. To that extent, the Government’s emergency application is effectively granted in part and the deadline in the challenged order is no longer effective. The rest of the District Court’s order remains in effect but requires clarification on remand. The order properly requires the Government to “facilitate” Abrego Garcia’s release from custody in El Salvador and to ensure that his case is handled as it would have been had he not been improperly sent to El Salvador. The intended scope of the term “effectuate” in the District Court’s order is, however, unclear, and may exceed the District Court’s authority. The District Court should clarify its directive, with due regard for the deference owed to the Executive Branch in the conduct of foreign affairs. For its part, the Government should be prepared to  share what it can concerning the steps it has taken and the prospect of further steps. The order heretofore entered by The Chief Justice is vacated.

Continue reading . . .