Harvey Weinstein Conviction Reversed

New York’s highest court reversed the conviction of the notorious Harvey Weinstein today, on the ground that evidence of other crimes was admitted beyond the limits allowed under New York’s landmark precedent in People v Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264 (1901). The court divided 4-3, with two judges recused and the replacements in the majority. That is, a majority of the court’s regular judges participating in the case voted to affirm.

Evidence of other crimes by the defendant is not admissible to prove his propensity to commit similar crimes, but it may be admissible for other purposes, such as impeaching his testimony. The majority held, “We conclude that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of uncharged, alleged prior sexual acts against persons other than the complainants of the underlying crimes because that testimony served no material non-propensity purpose.”

The case goes back for a retrial. As the reversal is on state-law evidence grounds, it is not subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Erin Mulvaney has this story in the WSJ. She notes, “Thursday’s ruling won’t make Weinstein a free man. In a separate case, a California jury convicted Weinstein of sex crimes in 2022. He was sentenced to 16 years in prison.” But that is not really 16 years because Cal. Gov. Gavin Newsom, through his prison department, is dispensing sentence-reducing credits hand-over-fist, even to some of the state’s worst criminals.

Among the dissenting judges, Judge Cannataro wrote:

Today’s majority decision represents an unfortunate step backwards from recent advances in our understanding of how sex crimes are perpetrated and why victims sometimes respond in seemingly counterintuitive ways, endangering decades of progress in this incredibly complex and nuanced area of law.

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The category of evidence subject to dispute is the admission of the testimony from the three additional Molineux witnesses. In their Molineux application, the People initially sought to call five additional witnesses in their case-in-chief, arguing that their testimony was relevant to the contested issues of lack of consent and forcible compulsion. The court precluded the People from introducing testimony from two of the proposed witnesses but otherwise granted the application. The trial court permitted these additional witnesses to testify to rebut defendant’s claim of consent and to demonstrate his intent to forcibly compel the complaining witnesses to engage in sexual acts with him—specifically, by engineering situations in which he could be alone with women, through an offer of professional assistance, giving the encounters the ostensible appearance of being consensual. Consistent with this ruling, the court gave the jury limiting instructions as to the purpose of the Molineux witnesses’ testimony—that these witnesses were not the complaining witnesses in the case and that their testimony “was not offered and must not be considered for the purpose of proving that the defendant had a propensity or predisposition to commit the crimes charged in this case. It was offered as evidence for your consideration on the issues of forcible compulsion and lack of consent.”