Category: Habeas Corpus

SCOTUS Softens Limits on Repeat Petitions by Federal Prisoners (But Not Much)

In the landmark Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress cracked down hard on repeated attacks on criminal judgments by state prisoners. It also cracked down on such attacks by federal prisoners, but whether the rules for federal prisoners are quite as severe as those for state prisoners is not clear from the language of the statute. Today the U.S. Supreme Court decided two lingering questions on the state-federal distinction in Bowe v. United States. The defendant won on both points.

The outcome is not too surprising. The Government agreed with the defendant on one of the points, and the court had to appoint an amicus to argue in support of the lower court decision. It is an honor to receive this kind of appointment, but victory is rare.

The crackdown on state prisoners is found in 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). Subdivision (1) flatly bars any do-over of a claim made in a previous habeas corpus petition. Subdivision (2) allows new claims, not previously made, only under very limited circumstances. Subdivision (3) requires a state prisoner seeking to file a second or successive petition to first get permission from the court of appeals, and paragraph (3)(E) forbids petitions for rehearing (by either the panel or full court of appeals) or certiorari (in the Supreme Court) to review the decision on whether to grant it.

Federal prisoners file under a different statute, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Subdivision (h) is the repeated attack crackdown. It requires a second or successive motion to be “certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain” either newly discovered evidence proving innocence or a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law. The distinction between do-overs and new claims in section 2244(b)(1) and (2) is absent. Does the language “as provided in section 2244” incorporate that section’s flat bar on all do-overs? Does it incorporate the bar on Supreme Court review of the certification decision? No and no. Continue reading . . .

U.S. Supreme Court Arguments This Week — Habeas Corpus

The U.S. Supreme Court has a two-day argument week this week, as today is Columbus Day. Three of the four cases are criminal cases, but none is a blockbuster. We have one case on habeas corpus, one on restitution and retroactivity, and one on the Fourth Amendment and emergency entry to houses. I will discuss the habeas corpus case in this post.

Bowe v. United States, No. 24-5438, on tomorrow’s (Tuesday’s) calendar, relates to a problem interpreting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) with regard to successive petitions by federal versus state prisoners. An unusual aspect of the case, as far as Supreme Court habeas corpus cases go, is that the petitioner is actually correct, in my opinion. The Solicitors General of both the current and previous administrations think so too on one of the questions, so a special amicus has been appointed to argue in support of the lower court decision. Continue reading . . .

Walters: Newsom Delusional on Cal. Mask Law

Dan Walters has this column at CalMatters on California Governor Newsom, masked ICE officers, and the recently enacted state statute on masking. “Newsom and any other critics of ICE tactics are delusional if they believe federal officers will be arrested and prosecuted for wearing masks after SB 627 takes effect.” The column headline, probably written by an editor and not by Walters, is oddly equivocal: “Court rulings cast doubt on California mask ban for federal officers.” Walters doesn’t say the ban is in doubt. He says there is no way it will be enforced. Continue reading . . .

Back-from-the-Dead Attack on Habeas Corpus Reform

Like a bad horror movie, a monster we thought we had killed in a past episode is back. The monster is the notion that the most important element of Congress’s 1996 reform of federal habeas corpus violates Article III of the Constitution because it binds federal courts to state courts’ interpretation of the Constitution, precluding the federal court from exercising independent judgment. In a nutshell, the law requires that when a defendant’s constitutional claim has been decided on the merits in state court, a federal court is precluded from nullifying that judgment on habeas corpus unless the state court was clearly wrong based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

In 1998, Columbia Law Review published an issue devoted to habeas corpus. James Liebman and William Ryan advanced the thesis described above in “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of the Federal Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696. I wrote the response article, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and The Legislative Power, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 888.

The Supreme Court resolved the issue in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). The resolution left a lot to be desired, but the result was that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) was enforced as the major reform it was intended to be, not watered down to a minor change based on the supposed constitutional limitation. Continue reading . . .

Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Evasion of Successive Habeas Petition Limit

In 1996, Congress cracked down hard on the then-routine practice of state prisoners filing one habeas corpus petition after another to attack the same criminal judgment. Relitigating the same claim is not allowed at all, and making new claims is severely restricted. Ever since, the defense bar has been trying to poke holes in this barrier, with varying degrees of success.

Today the Supreme Court slammed shut a loophole that had been created by one court of appeals but rejected by most of them. Convicted child abuser Danny Rivers claimed that he could request to amend his habeas corpus petition to add a new claim even after his initial petition had been denied by the district court and was pending on appeal. The unanimous opinion by Justice Jackson holds:

A second-in-time §2254 petition generally qualifies as a second or successive application, triggering the requirements of §2244(b), when an earlier filed petition has been decided on the merits and a judgment exists. Because the Fifth Circuit correctly applied this straightforward rule, we affirm.

Continue reading . . .

Amending the Complaint After Losing the Case

The U.S. Supreme Court has two cases on its docket this year addressing attempts to amend a complaint or petition after the case has already been decided in the trial court and gone to the court of appeals. BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, decided today, is a regular civil case.  Rivers v. Guerrero is a habeas corpus case, in which CJLF has filed an amicus brief.

Today’s decision in BLOM Bank looks very good for the prospect of success in Rivers. It is in line with the approach of our Rivers brief . Continue reading . . .

Modifying Federal Sentences

Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), provides a limited authority for a federal judge to modify a previously imposed term of imprisonment. One of the grounds, in subparagraph (1)(A), is that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” Today the U.S. Supreme Court took up the case of Fernandez v. United States, No. 24-556, to decide if reasons that would support a motion to vacate a sentence constitute grounds for a 3582(c)(1)(A) modification. The motion-to-vacate statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, is Congress’s substitute for habeas corpus for federal prisoners.

Continue reading . . .

Venezuelan Gang Case Must Proceed in Habeas Corpus

The U.S. Supreme Court has resolved the case of deportation of Venezuelans alleged to be members of the Tren de Aragua gang, just as I said in this post on March 26. The case that arrived in the Supreme Court is the wrong type of case, filed in the wrong court, and the high court vacated it. This case must proceed in habeas corpus, and it must be brought in the district where the petitioners are detained, which is in Texas.

The opinion is here. Continue reading . . .

USCA-DC Decision in Venezuelan Gang Case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has split 2-1 in case of the deportation of Venezuelans alleged to be members of the extremely violent Tren de Aragua gang. The majority upheld the temporary restraining order issued by the District Court. The case is J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 25-5067.

The merits of the controversy aside, I believe the dissenting judge is correct on the threshold point. The D.C. federal courts have no jurisdiction here. This is, or should be, a habeas corpus case, and it must be brought in the district where the petitioners are confined, naming the head of that facility as the respondent. CJLF helped establish that rule 21 years ago, in Rumsfeld v. Padilla. Continue reading . . .

Are State Courts Required to Accept a Confession of Error in a Capital Case?

Two years ago, in Escobar v. Texas, No. 21-1601, the Supreme Court issued a “grant, vacate, and remand” order directing the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to reconsider its denial of relief to a death-sentenced murderer ” in light of the confession of error by Texas,” i.e., by the Travis County District Attorney. Are state courts required to accept such confessions of error, however dubious?

In California, “progressive” district attorneys have made wholesale confessions of error in capital cases just because they disagree with the decision of the people to have capital punishment. Courts have mostly rolled over and gone along with these “take a dive” actions, although last week a Santa Clara County judge did draw the line at resentencing Richard Farley for seven murders. See NBC story here. Continue reading . . .