USCA-DC Decision in Venezuelan Gang Case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has split 2-1 in case of the deportation of Venezuelans alleged to be members of the extremely violent Tren de Aragua gang. The majority upheld the temporary restraining order issued by the District Court. The case is J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 25-5067.

The merits of the controversy aside, I believe the dissenting judge is correct on the threshold point. The D.C. federal courts have no jurisdiction here. This is, or should be, a habeas corpus case, and it must be brought in the district where the petitioners are confined, naming the head of that facility as the respondent. CJLF helped establish that rule 21 years ago, in Rumsfeld v. Padilla.

Dissenting Judge Walker notes that the plaintiffs began their case with a pleading plainly designated a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the lead opinion, Judge Henderson says, “But they quickly abandoned their habeas claims and no longer contest their confinement, only their detention.” That makes no sense. Federal habeas law does not distinguish “confinement” from “detention” for this purpose. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has many times cited challenges to “detention” as the primary purpose of habeas corpus. Boumediene v. Bush, for example, said “Alexander Hamilton likewise explained that by providing the detainee a judicial forum to challenge detention, the writ preserves limited government.”

Judge Henderson tries to distinguish Rumsfeld by citing it as “explaining that habeas’ geographic limits have
‘no application’ when plaintiffs are ‘not challenging any present physical confinement.’ ” This borders on dishonest. What Rumsfeld actually says on the cited page (542 U.S. at 439) is that precedents establish that when a petitioner is not in physical confinement at all but is allowed to use habeas corpus to challenge future confinement then the rule does not apply. On the following two pages, the Rumsfeld court also noted that a petitioner who began a habeas corpus case in the district where she was confined, but who was then transferred elsewhere, could continue the case in the original court with a substitute respondent. The court then distinguished the case before it, where Padilla was in custody in South Carolina when he filed his petition in New York, naming the Secretary of Defense as the respondent. That is not allowed. The proper respondent was the commander of the brig where Padilla was detained. “The District of South Carolina, not the Southern District of New York, was the district court in which Padilla should have brought his habeas petition.”

Under Rumsfeld, this case belongs in the Southern District of Texas. Filing it in D.C. is just judge shopping and ought not be allowed.

On the merits, there is a genuine concern that an unseemly rush may sweep up people who are not, in fact, members of Tren de Aragua. There is also a real issue whether the Alien Enemies Act applies. But these are matters to be decided by the correct court in the correct proceeding.