Category: Sentencing

Yes, Murder Is a Violent Offense

Last year, when the U.S. Supreme Court took up the case of Delligatti v. United States, I noted in this post the absurdity of the question. Today, the Court decided the case. Yes, murder is a “crime of violence” for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by six other Justices. So who are two? Continue reading . . .

Canadian Study Finds Length of Incarceration Decreases Recidivism

Simon Fraser University in British Columbia has this press release announcing this study in the Journal of Criminal Justice regarding the effect of sentence length on recividism. Overall, studies on this issue have mixed results and generally show little effect either way, as Elizabeth Berger and I describe in this article, which is cited in the new article.

Here is the abstract: Continue reading . . .

Drugs, Treatment, Jail, and Indirect Consequences

The folks in favor of so-called criminal justice “reform” are fond of simplistic slogans such as “treatment, not jail” for drug offenders. However, as this story by Julie Watts at Sacramento’s CBS 13 indicates, “reform” measures can sometimes undermine treatment rather than promote it. This is one more example of a primary cause of bad policy — failure to consider the indirect consequences and considering only the direct consequences.

Once upon a time, drug courts were a key element of criminal justice reform. These specialized courts provide an alternative to people arrested for drug crimes, either possession or low-level dealing. If they agree to treatment and follow through to completion of the program, the criminal charges will be dropped. As described in the story, many people credit these programs with savings their lives.

But what happens when the criminal penalties for low-level drug offenses are lowered so far that the incentive vanishes? Continue reading . . .

Free the Detergent!

The San Diego Union-Tribune has this editorial, titled Endorsement: Yes on Prop. 36: Time to free the detergent.

The coming landslide win for Proposition 36 will be a triumph for truth over spin. The San Diego Union-Tribune Editorial Board has long supported criminal justice reform. But in real time, we saw the obvious flaws of Proposition 47 — the November 2014 measure that Proposition 36 is meant to fix. It changed many “nonviolent” felonies into misdemeanors in a ham-handed way that incentivized certain crimes.

Eleven months later, The Washington Post dispatched a reporter to San Diego who wrote an unforgettable account showing the incredulity of law enforcement over the new status quo: “instead of arresting criminals and removing them from the streets, their officers have been dealing with the same offenders again and again. Caught in possession of drugs? That usually means a misdemeanor citation under Prop 47, or essentially a ticket. Caught stealing something worth less than $950? That means a ticket, too. Caught using some of that $950 to buy more drugs? Another citation.

Nothing has changed since then — unless you count the emergence of a cottage industry determined to depict Proposition 47 as good no matter what. So store clerks say they’ve stopped reporting thefts because there’s no point? It’s a blip. So store owners are spending heavily to lock up more goods than ever, including detergent? There’s no proof that’s necessary — the corporations in charge have an agenda.

Manipulation of crime statistics, one of our favorite subjects, enters into the picture: Continue reading . . .

Hit Man Sentenced to No Punishment At All for Murder

AP reports:

A former Mafia hitman already serving life in prison was sentenced to 25 years Friday in the 2018 fatal prison bludgeoning of notorious Boston gangster James “Whitey” Bulger.

Prosecutors said Fotios “Freddy” Geas used a lock attached to a belt to repeatedly hit the 89-year-old Bulger in the head hours after he arrived at the troubled U.S. Penitentiary, Hazelton, from another lockup in Florida in October 2018. Defense attorneys disputed that characterization Friday, saying Geas hit Bulger with his fist.

The Justice Department said last year that it would not seek the death penalty against Geas in Bulger’s killing.

Congress abolished parole in the federal system many years ago, so life in federal prison is life without parole. Gaes’s new sentence is nominally consecutive to his life sentence, meaning it will begin the day he dies. Hence, he has been sentenced to no punishment at all. The government even plea-bargained a clearly premeditated murder down to manslaughter. Continue reading . . .

Cal. Prop. 47 Fix Initiative Ahead Over 2/1

U.Cal. Berkeley’s Institute for Governmental Studies has a poll taken early this month on three initiatives on that state’s ballot. The press release is here. Proposition 36 is a measure to fix some of the problems resulting from 2014’s Proposition 47. The poll shows Prop. 36 ahead by 56-23 with 21% undecided.

A landslide win would send a strong signal that the state’s voters are waking up to the reality that the claims that going soft on crime actually improves public safety are nonsense.

Early polls showing an initiative ahead generally need to be regarded with caution, as the late breaks in voting tend to be toward “no,” but this is such a strong lead that this tendency may not matter. Continue reading . . .

Final Orders List

The U.S. Supreme Court issued the last regular orders list of the term today. The court took up two cases on resentencing under First Step Act (which should have been titled the False Step Act or perhaps the Misstep Act). If a federal criminal sentenced before the Act gets a resentencing for some reason, does he get the benefit of the Act’s softer sentencing?

There will be a few orders lists during the summer recess, but they will likely be procedural matters, not decisions on whether to take up a new case.

Continue reading . . .

Jury Trial and Crimes on Different Occasions

Today the Supreme Court decided the latest installment in the continuing saga of jury trial on sentence-determining facts. The case is Erlinger v. United States, No. 23-370.

The Armed Career Criminal Act provides for an enhanced sentence for violators with three prior violent felony convictions of crimes “committed on occasions different from one another.” So who decides if the occasions are different? No one who has followed the Apprendi line of cases will be surprised to learn that the Court held that the right of jury trial extends to this determination.

On the facts of the case, the “different occasions” element is so obvious that a jury would be able to decide it without even sitting down, yet the case goes back to convene a jury for this purpose, unless this can be considered a “harmless error.” Continue reading . . .

Released Robber Robs Again the Next Day

On May 7, convicted robber Eric Gray was released from San Quentin. The next day he robbed a bank in Orange County, California and held three employees prisoner. He presently faces charges in federal court. The Orange County Register has this article.

The federal complaint states that “Gray has a lengthy criminal history that includes, but is not limited to, grand theft auto, robbery, sexual battery, and narcotics-related offenses. Continue reading . . .

Is Murder a Violent Offense?

To anyone with common sense, the title of this post seems to be a contender for the most absurd question that can possibly be asked. Yet, believe it or not, the U. S. Supreme Court today took up a case that asks that question, Delligatti v. United States, No. 23-825.

According to the government brief on the question of whether to take the case up, defendant Salvatore Delligatti was “an associate in the Genovese Crime Family,” who was hired to murder someone and then subcontracted the job. The plot failed when the police were alerted and arrested the subs. Among other crimes, Delligatti was charged with gang-related attempted murder in violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, and “carrying a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

Delligatti was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 25 years in prison, of which 5 years were for the § 924 gun charge. He argued in the trial court and on appeal that murder as defined in New York is not a “crime of violence” within the definition of § 924(c) because that definition requires physical force, and it is possible to commit murder in New York by failure to act when one has a duty to act, which does not involve physical force. Continue reading . . .