Category: U.S. Supreme Court

Supreme Court Takes Up Capital Habeas Corpus Case

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning decided to take up for full briefing and argument the Arizona capital habeas corpus case of Shinn v. Ramirez, No. 20-1009.

The case involves the interaction between the Court’s “equitable exception” to the procedural default rule in Martinez v. Ryan and one of the lesser-known habeas reforms of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Continue reading . . .

Supreme Court Limits “Caretaking” Searches and Seizures in Home

The U.S. Supreme Court today decided Caniglia v. Strom, No. 20-157:

Decades ago, this Court held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973). In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that police officers who patrol the “public highways” are often called to discharge noncriminal “community care-taking functions,” such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents. Id., at 441. The question today is whether Cady’s acknowledgment of these “caretaking” duties creates a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home. It does not. Continue reading . . .

Ramos Not Retroactive; Second Teague Exception Is Dead

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Edwards v. Vannoy, No. 19-5807, that the rule it established last year that the Constitution requires that criminal case juries must be unanimous is not retroactive to overturn cases that were already final on appeal when Ramos v. Louisiana was decided.

The holding is correct beyond question if one correctly applies the Court’s precedents under Teague v. Lane. For the full details, see the series of posts I wrote after the oral argument:

A Teague Primer

Making an Easy Retroactivity Case Difficult: The Argument in Edwards v. Vannoy — Part I, Overruling Apodaca

Making an Easy Retroactivity Case Difficult: The Argument in Edwards v. Vannoy — Part II, Reasonable Minds Before Ramos

An Easy Retroactivity Case Made Difficult — Part III, Teague‘s Phantom Exception

Today, the ghostbusters have finally purged the phantom. The Court has finally taken the step that I have urged many times since Teague and admitted that the “second exception” for “watershed rules” is not merely comatose, it is dead. It has been dead for a long time, but the false promise required attorneys to brief it and courts to decide it in every habeas retroactivity case. Continue reading . . .

Dumping a Dishonest Precedent Less Than Honestly — Part II

In Jones v. Mississippi, decided April 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in cases where a juvenile is facing life without parole (LWOP) for murder, all that is needed to comply with its 2012 precedent in Miller v. Alabama is for the sentencing court to have discretion to choose a lower sentence and consider the defendant’s youth in making the choice.

That would have been fairly straightforward based on Miller itself. The complications arose from the 2016 decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, making Miller retroactive so as to require resentencing for a 1963 murder. The problem, as explained at length in the previous post, is that Montgomery contradicted Miller in order to achieve that result, and Montgomery even contradicted itself, making statements that cannot be reconciled.

In Jones, the majority opinion joined by five Justices and the dissent joined by three have many sharp points of disagreement, but they agree on one thing. Both maintain the fiction that Montgomery is consistent with Miller. As a result, neither opinion’s analysis can possibly be completely correct, and neither is. Continue reading . . .

SCOTUS Orders Monday

The U.S. Supreme Court released its regular Monday orders list today. Not surprisingly, there were several wake-of-Jones orders in cases that had been on hold for that decision. Oklahoma v. Johnson, No. 19-250, and United States v. Briones, No. 19-720, were sent back for reconsideration. These were cases where the lower court decided in an under-18 murderer’s favor based on a broad interpretation of Montgomery v. Louisiana. Cases where the lower court ruled against the defendant based on a narrow interpretation of Montgomery were simply denied, including Newton v. Indiana, No. 17-1511, and Garcia v. North Dakota, No. 19-399. Continue reading . . .

Dumping a Dishonest Precedent Less Than Honestly — Part I

Last week the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Jones v. Mississippi, regarding the constitutional requirements to sentence an under-18 murderer to life in prison without parole (LWOP). The majority opinion claims to “carefully follow[] both Miller [v. Alabama] and Montgomery [v. Louisiana].” The dissent claims “the Court guts” both decisions. Neither statement is completely right. Neither could be, given that Montgomery contradicts both Miller and itself.

About all that is left of Montgomery is its bare holding that Miller is retroactive. That holding will soon be essentially moot, as nearly all the murderers who killed before their 18th birthday who qualify for reconsideration under Miller will either have had a new decision in their cases (see footnote 6 of Jones, last sentence) or have lost their right to seek it by delay. The holding stands like the chimney of a house that burned down, useless but still standing.

There is a certain poetic justice in Montgomery being largely relegated to the dustbin in a less-than-honest decision, as Montgomery itself is among the most dishonest decisions in recent Supreme Court history. Continue reading . . .

USCA9 “Clearly Erred” on Habeas Corpus. Again.

In today’s only decision from the United States Supreme Court, the court reversed a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in which that court had taken an expansive view of its own jurisdiction. The Supreme Court summarily reversed, meaning that it did not see any need to take further briefing or hear oral argument, as it does when there is some doubt of the correct result. The unsigned opinion says the Ninth Circuit “clearly erred.” No dissent is indicated.

This is not the first time the Supreme Court has rebuked the Ninth in this manner on this subject. It is not the second, third, or fourth. I stopped counting years ago.

Why is the Ninth so consistently the “gang that can’t shoot straight” on this particular topic? Continue reading . . .