SCOTUS Picks More Low-Hanging Fruit

The U.S. Supreme Court issued two unanimous decisions today, one in a criminal case and one in a “crimmigration” case. No new criminal or related cases were taken up for full briefing and argument.

United States v. Cooley, No. 19-1414, holds that a tribal police officer may temporarily detain and search a non-Indian for suspected violation of state or federal law. Cooley was parked on the side of US 212 in the Crow Reservation in Montana. When the officer approached to see if someone needed assistance, he found Cooley with bloodshot eyes and with two semiautomatic rifles on the front seat. A subsequent search found methamphetamine. Justice Breyer wrote the unanimous opinion upholding the search, reversing the Ninth Circuit.

Garland v. Ming Dai, No. 19-1155, involves the standard for review of facts, especially credibility of witnesses, in deportation cases. These cases are heard initially by an immigration judge and may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA’s decisions may be reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals.

The normal rule is that appellate courts defer to the findings of fact made by the tribunal that actually heard the witnesses in person. However, the Ninth Circuit had developed a different rule for these cases.

For many years, and over many dissents, the Ninth Circuit has proceeded on the view that, “[i]n the absence of an explicit adverse credibility finding [by the agency], we must assume that [the alien’s] factual contentions are true” or at least credible. [Citations.] This view appears to be an outlier.

Justice Gorsuch wrote the unanimous opinion:

The Ninth Circuit’s deemed-true-or-credible rule cannot be reconciled with the INA’s terms. Instead, immigration cases like these should proceed as follows. First, the factfinder—here the IJ—makes findings of fact, including determinations as to the credibility of particular witness testimony. The BIA then reviews those findings, applying a presumption of credibility if the IJ did not make an explicit adverse credibility determination. Finally, the court of appeals must accept the agency’s findings of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

Reversed.

In other action, Justice Kavanaugh wrote a brief opinion concurring in an order to send a domestic violence case back to reconsider in light of Caniglia v. Strom, the case that declined to extend the “community caretaking” doctrine to entries to the home.

To be clear, however, the fact that the Eighth Circuit used a now-erroneous label does not mean that the Eighth Circuit reached the wrong result. Caniglia did not disturb this Court’s longstanding precedents that allow warrantless entries into a home in certain circumstances. See ante, at 1 (Roberts, C. J., concurring). Of particular relevance here, the Court has long said that police officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant” is “seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 400, 403. On remand, the Eighth Circuit will be able to consider precedents such as Brigham City.