Judicial Override, the Sixth Amendment, and Retroactivity
Sentencing a murderer to death generally requires three decisions in the United States today: (1) a factual finding that the defendant is guilty of the highest degree of murder; (2) a further factual finding that an additional aggravating factor is true;* and (3) a discretionary decision that death is the appropriate punishment for this murder and this murderer, considering both aggravating and mitigating factors.
The first decision must be made by a jury under the Sixth Amendment, unless the defendant waives that right. In Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the second decision must also be made by a jury, though it previously held the opposite multiple times. The third decision may be vested in a judge (or panel of judges) or a jury by state law. Only Nebraska currently vests the decision in judges.
If a state can vest the decision in the judge entirely, can it also have a jury make a recommendation but still leave the final decision with the judge no matter what the jury recommends? Of course. If a state has such a system but decides to change it and make the jury’s life-sentence recommendation binding, does the U.S. Constitution require that it make that change retroactive, overturning final judgments entered under the old system? Of course not.
Yet that question is before the Supreme Court today in the case of hired hit man Kenneth Eugene Smith. [Update: Stay denied without comment or dissent.] Continue reading . . .
