Jones v. Hendrix Argument
The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded its oral argument in Jones v. Hendrix. The question is whether federal prisoners who have already had an appeal and one or more collateral reviews of their convictions can use the “saving clause” of 28 U.S.C. §2255(e) to bring habeas corpus petitions in certain cases in which Congress has forbidden a successive 2255 petition.
The claim is that 2255(e) preserves claims that were traditionally cognizable in habeas despite the 1996 amendment that limited successive petitions. It is difficult to make a prediction from argument. Several of the justices said little or nothing. However, I was encouraged that some justices questioned what point in habeas history we should be looking at. The availability of habeas corpus has varied widely throughout history. The kind of claim at issue in this case would not have been cognizable in early America, as documented in our brief in this case.
The audio recording and the transcript of argument are will be available on the Court’s website later today.
I take it that it gives you no pause that he is serving 27 years for conduct that is clearly not a crime under Supreme Court precedent.
His conduct is a crime. He possessed a gun after numerous felony convictions. As the Government’s brief says at page 32, “the record makes abundantly clear that he knew that he had been convicted of multiple felonies and, moreover, actually knew that he was not supposed to have a gun.”
But the government did not prove that, which is why if his petition was heard he would win. And of course this would apply to bar any innocent person from relief.
The government did not prove that because and only because it was established law at the time of trial that knowledge was not an element of the crime. That is the problem with applying new rules retroactively. Judgments get overturned that would have been decided the same way if the new rule had been in effect at the time.
As was noted in the argument (transcript p. 69), this kind of claim was not eligible for collateral relief at all before 1974, cases of innocence of this type were remedied via executive clemency, and the small number of actual innocence cases arising from retroactivity of Rehaif can be handled that way again.