Should people with intellectual disability be exempt from capital punishment? If so, who decides where and how to draw the line? The U.S. Supreme Court opened a can of worms with its 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia that a categorical exemption is constitutionally required. Last Friday* the court decided to look into this can once again, taking up the case of Alabama murderer Joseph Smith. The case is Hamm v. Smith, No. 24-872.
When the Supreme Court announced its decision 23 years ago, it seemed to be constitutionalizing only the yes-or-no decision, leaving the line-drawing to the states. Even while making a dubious finding of consensus on the categorical exemption, the court acknowledged disagreement on how to draw the line. Quoting an earlier decision forbidding execution of insane persons, the opinion said, “we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.”
This holding of Atkins was effectively overruled by later decisions. In the Smith case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has told Alabama it is drawing the line wrong. There are two problems. First, how do you determine the possible range of someone’s “true IQ” when he has multiple test scores? Second, can we declare a person intellectually disabled even though the probability that his true IQ is below 70 is vanishingly small?
Looming over these two questions is a larger question. Do the questions above have right and wrong answers as a matter of federal constitutional law, or should the Supreme Court return to honoring its long-ago, much-violated promise in Atkins that the states would have leeway in these matters? Continue reading . . .
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