Qualified Immunity and Prison Conditions

The U.S. Supreme Court released two summary opinions today. One case involves a suit by a prisoner against corrections officers. A second is a suit by a police officer is against a protest organizer for violence by a protester. Both cases were sent back for further consideration. This post addresses the prison case.

Taylor v. Riojas, No. 19-1261, is the prisoner suit. The prisoner claims to have been confined in truly deplorable conditions. These allegations have not yet been determined to be true or false. The District Court granted summary judgment to the officers on the basis of qualified immunity. That is, the District Court held that regardless of whether the allegations are true the prisoner still would not have a case because the law is not clearly established that the conditions he alleges would violate the Eighth Amendment.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed as to all but one of the allegations.

The Supreme Court reversed today:

The Fifth Circuit erred in granting the officers qualified immunity on this basis. “Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam). But no reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period of time.

Justice Alito did not think this case met the criteria for the Supreme Court to get involved. On the merits, though, he agreed that the Fifth Circuit had erred.

I usually agree with Justice Alito, but not this time. Excessively broad application of qualified immunity such as the one in this case has several ill effects. Most obviously, it effectively condones a clear violation of constitutional rights and cuts off what may be the only effective remedy.

The indirect effects are also serious. The few “bad apples” in law enforcement are more likely to be culled out if they cost their employers civil judgments. (These suits are against the officers, but usually, though not always, the employer pays the judgment.) Additionally, egregious examples such as this undermine public support for qualified immunity, and could eventually result in legislation to abolish it. Some proposals nonsensically call for abolishing qualified immunity for law enforcement officers only, leaving it in place for all other officials.

Qualified immunity, properly applied, is essential for the protection of law enforcement officers doing their duty as best they understand it. The fact that a court changes the law years after the fact is no reason to threaten an officer with personal liability with only a “maybe” for indemnification by the employer.

Contrary to the popular myth, qualified immunity does not require an exact factual match in case law before a suit can go forward. The high court was correct to fire a warning shot across the bow of courts that have been stretching it too far.

The Court did not take up any new cases for full briefing and argument in today’s orders list.