Lying During, and About, Plea Bargaining

SL&P has this post bemoaning that so much lying goes on during, and to prop up, the negotiation and tendering of bargained-for guilty pleas.  The gist of the post  —  you will not be shocked to hear  —  is that the system is rigged against blameless defendants, who then, with the cynically weary but perforce assistance of their lawyers, lie repeatedly by admitting to crimes they did not commit.

I litigated criminal cases in federal court for a quarter of a century.  There is indeed a considerable amount of lying that goes on.  But it’s not defendants’ admitting to stuff they didn’t do.  It’s defendants’ denying stuff they most certainly did do.  Anyone who actually does criminal litigation will admit this if approached in a rare moment of candor.

Still, let’s assume arguendo that innocent defendants, with their lawyers’ connivance, do falsely inculpate themselves by lying during plea bargaining in order, they calculate, to evade the otherwise looming draconian consequences of a rigged system.  Let me suggest a simple six-word remedy:  Quit lying and tell the truth.

I addressed this subject in some detail in my Feddie Night Fights debate earlier this year with Clark Neily of the libertarian Cato Institute.  This was my answer:

In federal court, the governing standard is Rule 11, FRCP.  It
provides that, before the judge may accept a plea, he must
personally and in open court address the defendant and advise                                                                                                                            him of a litany of rights he would have if he were to go forward                                                                                                                          with a trial, including, to name a few,  the right  to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to be protected                                                                                                                           from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and present                                                                                                                        evidence,and to compel the attendance of witnesses.

For our purposes, perhaps the two most important
guarantees in Rule ll are these:

(b)(2)  ENSURING THAT A PLEA IS VOLUNTARY.

Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court
must…determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result                                                                                                                                from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea
agreement).

(b)(3)  DETERMINING THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR A PLEA.

Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.

Now let’s consider how those guarantees square with the claim
that defendants plead guilty, and are sent to
prison, for things they didn’t do.  In that regard, it’s helpful, indeed                                                                                                                         it’s essential, to know the specifics of what establishing the factual basis for                                                                                                           a plea means on the ground.

In negotiating the plea, the prosecutor and defense
counsel hammer out a statement describing the offense to which
the plea will be entered, and the defendant’s conduct in
committing that offense.  At the Rule 11 hearing, the judge asks
the prosecutor to state the factual basis for the plea, whereupon
the prosecutor reads aloud the agreed-upon statement. The judge
then turns to the defendant and asks him,                                                                                                                                                                      “Is that what happened?” or “Do you have any disagreement with that
statement?” or some close variant of those questions.  In the
unusual case where defendant shows any hesitation, the court
will take a recess to allow the two sides to work it out if they can.
If they can’t, the plea does not go down and case will be set for
trial.

When, as in the typical case, the defendant agrees to the factual
basis as recited, the court will then turn to defense counsel and
ask him if he is satisfied that the defendant has had an adequate
opportunity to discuss the statement of facts with him, and if he is
satisfied that the defendant’s agreement to it is informed and
voluntary.  Again, the hearing will not go forward if counsel shows
any hesitation in answering.

Now all my experience is in federal court, and the regimen in
various state courts may be different.  But I believe the great                                                                                                                            majority of states have plea taking procedures similar to, if not
even more elaborate than, the ones I have described.

It is sometimes said that the Rule 11 hearing is merely a pro
forma event, a bunch of winks and nods, during which both sides just go                                                                                                      through the motions.  For those who think that, I have an invitation:  Go to a
plea hearing and see for yourself.  See for yourself whether the
judge has a sleepy disinterest in whether the defendant he’s
about to send to prison is guilty or innocent.  See for yourself
whether the prosecutor is so  steeped in dishonesty, and so
lacking in basic decency, that he will condemn an innocent man
simply to put another scalp on the mantle.  See for yourself
whether the defendant’s lawyer is so oblivious, callous and
corrupted and that he plays a central part in the charade, knowing
it’s all fabricated.  And see for yourself whether all three are
cooperating with one another with sly nods in what in any
other context would be called a conspiracy.

Now maybe that is what you’ll see.  But in 25 years inside the
system, it’s not what I saw.

************************************************

Still, for those who persist in thinking that defense counsel routinely                                                                                                                  help send innocent clients to jail with fake guilty pleas, I have a suggestion.                                                                                                       We should make explicit in the canons of ethics that it is
impermissible for defense counsel to assist in helping to convict,
through plea bargaining or otherwise, a client who has
unambiguously insisted on his innocence, or whom counsel
knows, or has strong reason to believe, is factually innocent.  As
the Supreme Court established in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S.
42 (1992), some goals of the criminal justice system are more
important than counsel’s wooden fidelity to what the client may
think is in his best interest.  In McCollum, it was the the system’s
need to rid itself of racist jury strikes even if the defendant believes                                                                                                                      that striking potential jurors on the basis of race would advance his                                                                                                                interests.  In the plea bargaining context, it’s the system’s need                                                                                                                                 to reduce the possibilities for erroneous and unjust outcomes.