Category: Terrorism

Venezuelan Gang Case Must Proceed in Habeas Corpus

The U.S. Supreme Court has resolved the case of deportation of Venezuelans alleged to be members of the Tren de Aragua gang, just as I said in this post on March 26. The case that arrived in the Supreme Court is the wrong type of case, filed in the wrong court, and the high court vacated it. This case must proceed in habeas corpus, and it must be brought in the district where the petitioners are detained, which is in Texas.

The opinion is here. Continue reading . . .

SCOTUS Reinstates Marathon Bomber’s Death Sentence

Opinion here. CJLF brief here. Prior post here. The prior post is an extended discussion of the evidence point in this case, while the brief is addressed primarily to the jury question. The issues are described in the prior post, so I will copy some of that material here.

In July of 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Boston reversed the death sentence and some of the convictions (though not on the capital offenses) of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the survivor of the pair of brothers who committed the horrible bombing of the Boston Marathon in 2013.

The Court of Appeals’ primary reason for reversal was its finding that during jury selection the trial court violated its half-century old rule in Patriarca v. United States, a precedent never mentioned by either party in the trial court or in the Court of Appeals’ pre-trial reviews of jury selection.
The court also said it would “address other issues (even if just briefly) because we know they are likely to resurface on remand.” One of those was a claim that the judge erred in not allowing hearsay evidence of an earlier, unrelated murder that the older brother was alleged to have been involved in. The six-Justice majority today disposed of both holdings without much difficulty. Continue reading . . .

Is the Federal Death Penalty Act’s Evidence Rule Unconstitutional?

Is the Federal Death Penalty Act’s evidence provision unconstitutional? Does the defendant have a constitutional right to introduce evidence of marginal probative value outweighed by other considerations, which the statute says the trial judge may exclude?

These are the surprising implications of the defense argument in the Boston Marathon Bomber case, argued in the U.S. Supreme Court October 13. I suppose if you are defending the indefensible you have to argue something. But it is surprising when a lawyer barely mentions the primary ground of the decision she is asking to have affirmed. Continue reading . . .