Category: U.S. Supreme Court

The Co-Defendant Confession Conundrum

Criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to confront the witnesses against them, a right that places a limit on the admission of out-of-court statements in addition to the general, exception-riddled rule of evidence against hearsay. But witnesses, for this purpose, do not include the defendant himself. So what do we do in a joint trial when a statement of one defendant incriminates them both? The Supreme Court sallied forth “once more unto the breach, dear friends” today in Samia v. United States, No. 22-196. Here is the holding from the syllabus:

Held: The Confrontation Clause was not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession that did not directly inculpate the defendant and was subject to a proper limiting instruction. Continue reading . . .

Supreme Court Narrows and Upholds Illegal Immigration Encouragement Law

The U.S. Supreme Court today decided United States v. Hansen, No. 22-179. The first paragraph of Justice Barrett’s opinion for the Court summarizes the decision well:

A federal law prohibits “encourag[ing] or induc[ing]” illegal immigration. 8 U. S. C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). After concluding that this statute criminalizes immigration advocacy and other protected speech, the Ninth Circuit held it unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. That was error. Properly interpreted, this provision forbids only the intentional solicitation or facilitation of certain unlawful acts. It does not “prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech”—let alone enough to justify throwing out the law’s “plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 292 (2008). We reverse. Continue reading . . .

Major Victory for Finality of Judgments

Today the U.S. Supreme Court issued a major decision on the finality of judgments in Jones v. Hendrix, No. 21-857. The Court rejected an attempt by the petitioner to do “an end-run around AEDPA,” i.e., the limits on collateral review of convictions enacted by Congress in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

Even more important, the Court has finally rejected the notion that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution requires collateral review of final judgments by courts of general jurisdiction. That clause is limited to the scope of habeas corpus understood at the time, which did not include such review. Congress may authorize such review, of course, but it is fully capable of imposing such limits as deems to be good policy.

We will have more to say on this important decision later.

CJLF’s brief in this case is available here.

Obstruction of Justice and Deportation

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning decided the “crimigration” case of Pugin v. Garland, No. 22-23. Among the many crimes that aliens can be deported for committing are offenses “relating to the obstruction of justice.” Does that term require that an investigation be pending, or can it include dissuading a witness from even reporting a crime?

The Fourth and Ninth Circuits went opposite ways on this question, and the Supreme Court took up both cases to resolve it. Continue reading . . .

Supreme Court Narrowly Interprets Mandatory Consecutive Sentencing Statute

Most of the time, when a defendant receives more than one sentence in a single case the judge has discretion to run the sentences consecutively or concurrently. Concurrent sentences, in effect, eliminate the shorter sentence(s); the defendant will do the time for the longest-sentence crime and will not do a single day in prison more for committing the additional crime(s). Cheaper by the dozen.

Legislatures can mandate consecutive sentences in particular circumstances, though. One such mandate is found in the very long and very confusing federal firearm crime sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924. The U.S. Supreme Court tends to interpret limits on judicial discretion narrowly, especially in sentencing. Today it gave the limit in §924(c) the narrower of two possible interpretations. No surprise there. The decision in Lora v. United States, No. 22-49, was unanimous. Continue reading . . .

No, Defendant Does Not Get Off Scot-Free for a Technical Error

This post on March 16 discussed the Supreme Court case of Smith v. United States, No. 21-1576. Smith had been tried in the wrong district, and his conviction was reversed on appeal. He claimed that the venue was an element of the offense, such that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded his retrial in the correct district.

I wrote then, “When this case first came up, I thought the claim to be so obviously wrong that there was no chance the Court would buy it. I still think so.”

Sure enough, the high court today decided that Smith can be retried. Unanimously. Continue reading . . .

SCOTUS Monday

It’s an uneventful Monday at the U.S. Supreme Court. The court issued an orders list but did not take up any cases for full briefing and argument. There are no summary decisions or dissents from denial of certiorari.

We are still waiting on two decisions from the present term: Jones v. Hendrix, No. 21-857, on successive collateral attacks by federal prisoners and Counterman v. Colorado, No. 22-138, on stalking laws and “true threats.”

Decisions are expected on Thursday and Friday this week.

Continue reading . . .

U.S. Supreme Court Curbs Overbroad Use of Identity Theft Law

Congress established a sentence enhancement for “aggravated identity theft,” 18 U. S. C. §1028A(a)(1), when one “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person” in the course of committing certain other crimes. This broad language can include a wide variety of misuses that would not even remotely come within what most people would regard as identity theft.

Today, the Supreme Court decided the case of Dubin v. United States, No. 22-10. Dubin’s actual crime was a rather mundane case of Medicaid fraud, disturbingly common but not unusual. He charged the government for testing by a licensed psychologist when the test was actually done by an associate and should have been paid at a lower rate. In the process of bilking this important government program, he necessarily used the patient’s Medicaid reimbursement number. He was not claiming to be someone he wasn’t. Is this “aggravated identity theft”? Continue reading . . .

SCOTUS Thursday

The U.S. Supreme Court has been issuing opinions only on Thursdays this month, with only orders lists on Mondays. That is a departure from past practice. The court issued three opinions today. It was a good day for landowners and homeowners, but no criminal cases.  One law-enforcement-related civil case was decided, but the issue was purely one of civil procedure. Continue reading . . .