Statutes of Limitations and Rape in the Military

The U.S. Supreme Court today upheld three court-martial convictions for rape, interpreting the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) statute of limitations in effect at the time as imposing no limit on rape prosecutions in the military. In the process, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the Eighth Amendment limitation of Coker v. Georgia (1977), forbidding the death penalty for rape, applies to the military.

Like many old statutes of limitations, the old UCMJ statute, which generally imposed a five-year limit, exempted crimes “punishable by death.” The UCMJ further provided that rape was punishable by death, also a common provision in days past. Simple question, right? Not so fast.

The defendants contended that rape in the military was not actually punishable by death because of the constitutional limitation in the Coker case. Therefore, the default five-year limit applied to their cases.

The government had two answers. First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, “punishable by death” in the UCMJ statute of limitations refers only to the punishments available on the face of the UCMJ without reference to other laws. Second, Coker does not apply to the military.

Today, the Supreme Court accepted the government’s first argument and just noted that the second was unresolved. The decision was unanimous among the eight justices participating. It is long-settled practice in the high court that if a case can be resolved on statutory grounds without resolving a constitutional question, the court will do so. It will leave the constitutional question to a future case where the outcome actually depends on the answer.

The Supreme Court’s micro-regulation of capital punishment, beginning in 1972, arose out of concern that the statutes in effect at the time were producing arbitrary and possibly discriminatory results. For the long version, see my 2019 OSJCL article, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: Lessons from a Failure of Judicial Activism. The military justice system is entirely different, as are its needs.

The Court has noted but not resolved this question before, see Loving v. United States (1996) at page 755. In that case, the Clinton Administration did not argue that the special requirements were inapplicable, though CJLF did as amicus. I do not expect that the issue will come up in the Biden Administration.

The military has done a poor job, overall, of supporting victims of rape. See this article from yesterday’s WSJ on a recent report on the Fort Hood troubles.

Today’s case is United States v. Briggs, No. 19-108.