Category: Criminal Procedure

Time to Overrule Miranda?

Yes, there is hope.  I explain why in my Substack entry,  here.  As a teaser, my first two paragraphs are:

In an earlier entry, “Democracy Dies in Judicial Imperialism,” I noted the similarity between Roe v. Wade and Miranda v. Arizona. In each case, the Court treated the liberal elite’s view of law as if it were part of the Constitution, thus to insulate it from any input from that pesky hoi polloi sometimes known as “voters.”

Roe and Miranda are probably the two most important examples of the sort of obey-your-betters judicial imperialism I was talking about. Roe went down three weeks ago. In this entry, I ask whether it’s time for Miranda to follow it into history’s dustbin. To avoid any suspense, the short answer is yes — indeed it’s past time — but I have my doubts that this is going to happen any time soon, even with a Supreme Court, like this one, that takes the Constitution seriously, both for what it says and what it refrains from saying. I’ll explain momentarily why I think Miranda will be with us for a while despite a more disciplined Court.

The Abortion Case and Criminal Law

The big news in law is, as we all know by now, the Supreme Court’s leaked draft opinion (per Alito, J.) overruling Roe and Casey.  The central holding of the draft is that the Constitution simply has nothing to say about abortion, and therefore that whether and in what ways it should be regulated are matters left to the political process.

CJLF takes no position on abortion, and neither for present purposes do I (a mere guest contributor here in any event).  But there is potentially very important news for criminal law in the draft opinion.

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Supreme Court Takes Up Arizona Murder Case

This morning, the U.S. Supreme Court released this orders list from last Friday’s conference. The Court took up the case of Cruz v. Arizona, No. 21-846. The case involves the familiar scenario of a murderer who could have made a particular objection at trial or on direct appeal but did not. When he tries to raise the objection in a collateral attack on the judgment, the state court tells him it is too late. As usual, the issue in this case has nothing whatever to do with whether the defendant committed the crime. It only relates to whether he should receive the punishment his crime deserves or whether justice should be tempered with mercy to let him off with less than he deserves.

From the state’s brief in opposition:

On the day he was killed, Officer Patrick Hardesty was questioning [John] Cruz as part of a hit-and-run investigation. App. 2a. During the questioning, Cruz ran from Officer Hardesty and Officer Hardesty gave chase on foot. Id. at 202–03, ¶¶ 2–4. At some point during the chase, Cruz shot the officer five times, emptying the five-shot revolver he was carrying. Two shots struck Officer Hardesty’s protective vest, two others struck him in the abdomen below the vest, and one entered his left eye, killing him almost instantly. Id. at 203, ¶¶ 5–7. Four of the shots were fired from no more than a foot away. Id. at 203, ¶ 6.

Cruz claims that the jury should have been told he would not be eligible for parole if they gave him life in prison. The Supreme Court precedent on that point was decided nine years before the crime. Cruz’s trial attorney did not request such an instruction, even though the trial judge offered one while denying a related motion, and his appellate attorney did not make that objection on direct appeal.

This is familiar turf for CJLF. We played a role in developing the rules that generally prohibit this kind of “heads I win, tails we take it over” gamesmanship. Continue reading . . .

CA Law Authorizes Biased Jurors

A California law which took effect in January prohibits prosecutors from removing people who are biased against police officers from juries in criminal trials.  The California jury selection process in criminal cases allows the prosecutor and the defense attorney 10 peremptory challenges for most felony trials, and 20 each for capital cases.  Prior law allowed these challenges to be exercised for any reason other than solely on the potential juror’s race, which is unconstitutional.  AB 3070 Weber (D Los Angeles) signed into law by Governor Newsom in September of 2020, prohibits the use of a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who considers police and/or the criminal justice system racist.  The law also supports objections by defense attorneys if the prosecutor challenges potential jurors who are inattentive, incoherent or threatening.  In a courtroom with a impartial judge who allows a challenge to a gang member who admits that he hates cops, the removal of the gang member from the jury will now become grounds for appeal.  The law does not prevent defense attorneys from removing potential jurors who express support for law enforcement or have friends or relatives who are police officers, prosecutors or judges, or who have been victims of crime.  Essentially Governor Newsom has approved a law that eliminates the constitutional right of an impartial jury.  The bill’s author, Shirley Weber, was appointed in 2020 by Governor Newsom to serve as Secretary of State.  She is the person in charge of California elections.

Using Prosecutorial Discretion to Negate Law

In a City Journal article former District Attorney Thomas Hogan notes that progressive DAs are abusing their discretion to set countywide policies to prevent the enforcement of laws enacted to discourage and punish crime.

Baltimore is not prosecuting shoplifting or drug-possession crimes. Despite recent violent protests and occupations, St. Louis is not pursuing cases for looting and rioting, while Portland isn’t pursuing charges for trespassing. Philadelphia won’t allow prostitution charges. San Francisco is not prosecuting indecent exposure offenses. Chicago declines arrests for thefts of less than $1,000.

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Gascón’s Directive Releases Dangerous Criminals on Probation

Los Angeles District Attorney George Gascón’s Special Directive 20-08,  forbids the deputies working for him from applying sentencing enhancements to charges against criminals, even for violent crimes. As reported by Los Angeles Association of Deputy District Attorneys (ADDA) President Michele Hanisee today:

Nearly all…crimes are probation eligible. Murder is probation eligible. Carjacking is probation eligible. Kidnapping is probation eligible. What typically causes a crime to be ineligible for probation is the addition of a sentencing enhancement, for example, use of a deadly weapon or infliction of great bodily injury. But since filing all but a handful of sentencing enhancements is prohibited, nearly every crime remains probation eligible. Thus – even for murder – the presumptive offer for those roughly 95,000 plus cases for which plea bargains are offered must be probation absent “extraordinary circumstances.”

The directive does not define what qualifies as “extraordinary circumstances.” What does that mean in the context of a murder case, or a carjacking case? But by definition, “extraordinary circumstances” will be a rare exception. The rule is that prosecutors must offer a plea bargain that results in the defendant going home on probation rather than serving time in custody.  Even for murder.

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Lying During, and About, Plea Bargaining

SL&P has this post bemoaning that so much lying goes on during, and to prop up, the negotiation and tendering of bargained-for guilty pleas.  The gist of the post  —  you will not be shocked to hear  —  is that the system is rigged against blameless defendants, who then, with the cynically weary but perforce assistance of their lawyers, lie repeatedly by admitting to crimes they did not commit.

I litigated criminal cases in federal court for a quarter of a century.  There is indeed a considerable amount of lying that goes on.  But it’s not defendants’ admitting to stuff they didn’t do.  It’s defendants’ denying stuff they most certainly did do.  Anyone who actually does criminal litigation will admit this if approached in a rare moment of candor.

Still, let’s assume arguendo that innocent defendants, with their lawyers’ connivance, do falsely inculpate themselves by lying during plea bargaining in order, they calculate, to evade the otherwise looming draconian consequences of a rigged system.  Let me suggest a simple six-word remedy:  Quit lying and tell the truth.

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Criminal Released Early in San Francisco Stabs Elderly Woman

The NYPost has this story on a 94-year-old Asian woman, Ann Taylor, who was stabbed by a man who was under ankle monitor surveillance when he committed this unprovoked attack against her in front of her San Francisco residence. The man, Daniel Cauich, “…had reportedly been arrested five times last year on burglary charges, was sprung by a judge on June 7 to await his trial after his most recent arrest for burglary on May 18.” 

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Murderer to be Tried as a Juvenile Years After Conviction Under Proposition 57

MyNewsLA has this story on Kevin Orellana, an 18-year-old who was murdered by two brothers in 2013 while playing handball at Reseda’s Cleveland High School. Orellana was approached by Anthony and Michael Carpio, both identified as gang members. Michael was hitting and fighting Orellana when Anthony began stabbing him as a gang challenge. Anthony, who was 16-years-old at the time stabbed Orellana 10 times in his head and neck, from behind, leading to his death.

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California Supreme Court Hears Argument Challenging Death Penalty Law

The California Supreme Court heard oral argument today in People v. McDaniel.  Donte McDaniel was convicted in 2009 of two brutal murders and attempted murder on two others.  In 2004, McDaniel and his accomplice entered a woman’s Los Angeles apartment looking for a man who had stolen drugs from another member of the gang he belongs to, the Bounty Hunter Bloods (BHB). McDaniel began firing as he walked in the door, shooting and killing the woman, then shooting the man he was looking for  so may times in the head that his face collapsed.  He shot two other women in the apartment, not involved in the drug dispute, critically injuring them both and leaving them permanently disabled.

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